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EAGLE VERSUS PHOENIX:
A TALE OF FEDERALISM
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT OPINION
ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA REGARDING
ARIZONA'S IMMIGRATION REFORM BILL, ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH CAROLINA'S
IMMIGRATION REFORM BILL, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOW SOUTH
CAROLINA CAN IMPROVE THE LANGUAGE OF ITS
BILL TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT IT
WILL PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
Samuel L. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 2010, the battle between the federal government and
Arizona over immigration enforcement finally came to a head, albeit a
temporary one, when United States District Court Judge Susan R.
Bolton' issued an order granting in part and denying in part the United
States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, thereby enjoining Arizona
from enforcing key parts of the "Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act," Senate Bill 1070, 2010 Arizona Session
Laws, Chapter 113, as amended by House Bill 2162, 2010 Arizona
Session Laws, Chapter 211.2
Amidst the escalation of human smuggling and other illegal
crossings into the United States along the United States-Mexican
The author gratefully acknowledges, and dedicates this article to, Jan M.
Baker, Legal Writing Instructor at the University of South Carolina School of
Law, for her diligent editing, invaluable criticism, and tireless support.
1 This author will refer to Judge Bolton as "the District Court" or "the
Court" throughout.
2 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (order
granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction). Though House
Bill 2162 is the modified version of Senate Bill 1070, this author will, like the
District Court, refer to them collectively as "S.B. 1070," "the Act," or "the
Arizona Act," unless this author specifically refers to House Bill 2162.
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border;3 increased kidnappings in Arizona;4 the nearby Mexican drug
war with all of the violence associated with it;5 fears of terrorist
infiltration at the U.S.-Mexican border;6 the continuing woes of the
U.S. economy; and the federal government's widely-perceived lack of
progress in the area of immigration enforcement, Arizona Governor
Janice K. Brewer signed into law S.B. 1070, the most stringent state
immigration law in the U.S., on April 23, 2010.8 Arizona's legislature
had passed similar immigration bills in recent years, but each were
vetoed by then-Governor Janet Napolitano, who incidentally is the
current Secretary of Homeland Security in the Obama Administration. 9
Here, however, Governor Brewer not only signed S.B. 1070 into law,
but she also signed H.B. 2162, which amended S.B. 1070, seven days
later, on April 30, 2010.o
S.B. 1070 soon led to a number of lawsuits against Arizona."
However, the following discussion will only address the lawsuit filed
In 2008, an estimated 500,000 illegal immigrants lived in Arizona alone.
Alan Silverleib, Arizona Governor Signs Changes Into [sic] Immigration Law,
CNN, May 1, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/30/arizona.immigration.law.changes/i
ndex.html. In 2008, an estimated 500,000 illegal immigrants lived in Arizona
alone. Indeed, this number is five times the number of illegal immigrants
present in Arizona in 1990. Elliot Spagat, Other Border States Shun Arizona's
Immigration Law, MSNBC (May 13, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37116159.
4 Spagat, supra note 3b.
Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to
Ideas, NEW YORK TIMES, June 20, 2010, at A 18,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/20crime.html?_r-l.
6 See Iraqi Terrorists Caught Along Mexican Border: American
Intelligence Chief Confirms 'People are Alive' as a Result of Capture,
WORLDNETDAILY (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.wnd.com/?pageld-43177.
Dan Nowicki, Arizona Immigration Law Ripples Through History, US.
Politics, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (July 25, 2010),
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/07/25/20100
725immigration-law-historypolitics.html.
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,
NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/24/us/politics/24immig.html. It is worth noting that last year alone, a record
222 laws and 131 resolutions among 48 states were passed addressing
immigration. Id.
9 Id.
10 Silverleib, supra note 3a.
" The following litigants, in addition to the federal govemment, have brought
suit against Arizona: David Salgado, Roberto Javier Frisancho (his case was
dismissed by the District Court on August 24, 2010), Martin Escobar (his case was
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by the United States Department of Justice, and, specifically, the
Court's consideration of its motion for preliminary injunction. On July
6, 2010, the United States filed a complaint challenging the
constitutionality of S.B. 1070 and filed a motion for preliminary
injunction to enjoin Arizona from enforcing S.B. 1070 until the Court
could determine the Act's constitutionality.12  The United States'
principal arguments in this case were that: (1) the power to regulate
immigration is vested solely in the federal government, (2) that
Arizona's immigration law was preempted by federal immigration law
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause under Article VI of the United States
Constitution, and (3) that Arizona usurped the federal government's
authority, thereby disrupting the federal government's balance of
objectives and priorities relating to immigration enforcement.' 3 The
District Court agreed with the federal government in several important
respects and accordingly issued a preliminary injunction order by
granting, in part, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.14
This article will proceed as follows: Part I focuses on each part of
the District Court's opinion and, following a discussion of each
provision of Arizona's immigration bill, discusses how any parallel
provision in South Carolina's pending immigration reform bill would
likely fare under similar constitutional scrutiny. The analysis begins by
discussing some parts of the District Court's opinion in which it
employed solid analysis to arrive at reasonable conclusions. The article
then asserts, in more detail, that parts of the District Court's opinion
also dismissed by the District Court, on August 31, 2010), the city of Tucson (it
joined Martin Escobar's case as plaintiffs; and its case is still pending at the time of
this writing, even though Escobar's case was dismissed), the National Coalition of
Latino Clergy and Christian Leaders (the case is pending at the time of this writing),
the League of United Latin American Citizens (the case is still pending), and a class
composed of ten individuals and fourteen labor, religious, and civil rights
organizations, such as the ACLU, NAACP, Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF), and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(NDLON) (this case is still pending). Elise Foley, Making Sense of the Arizona SB
1070 Lawsuits, WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT (September 3, 2010),
http://washingtonindependent.com/96646/making-sense-of-the-arizona-sb- 1070-
lawsuits; see also Alex DiBranco, ACLU Files Lawsuit Against Arizona SB 1070,
CHANGE.ORG (May 17, 2010), http://immigration.change.org/blog/view/aclu
files-lawsuit-against arizona sb_1070.
12 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
"3 Id. at 990-91. See also Elise Foley, Justice Department Sues
Arizona Over Immigration Law, WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT (July 6,
2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/90949/justice-department-sues-arizona-
over-immigration-law.
14 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. 990.
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arrive at either a reasonable conclusion through questionable analysis
or at troublesome conclusions through questionable analysis. Part I
concludes by arguing that some parts of the District Court's opinion
arrive at a troublesome conclusion through solid analysis. Finally, Part
II suggests how South Carolina might alter the language of its bill to
improve its chances of success against constitutional challenges.
I. DISCUSSION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER ISSUED BY
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
As the District Court correctly pointed out in its preliminary
injunction order, S.B. 1070 could not be entirely enjoined because it
contained a severability clause that stated that the invalidity of any one
provision would not affect the applicability of separable, valid
provisions.' 5 The Court also set forth the standard of review for a
preliminary injunction: "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest."' 6 The Court, therefore, separated those provisions of
S.B. 1070 on which the federal government would likely be unable to
demonstrate federal preemption on the merits, and thus would not be
enjoined, from those provisions of S.B. 1070 on which the federal
government would likely be able on the merits to demonstrate federal
preemption, and thus would be enjoined.' 7 This article asserts that
although the Court reached many reasonable conclusions in
determining those provisions that should be enjoined and those that
should not be, it also reached some troublesome conclusions in making
these determinations. Likewise, the analyses that the Court employed
to reach its conclusions were largely sound, but were also questionable
at times.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REASONABLE CONCLUSIONS BASED
ON SOLID ANALYSIS
Because the accuracy of the District Court's conclusions and
analysis pertaining to the following provisions is not disputed by this
's Id. at 986 (citing S.B. 1070 § 12(A) (2010)).
16 Id. at 991 (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24-25, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citations omitted)).
7 Id. at 986-87.
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author, less discussion will be conducted in this Section. However,
because some of the analysis is based on Arizona and Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence, support will be given to this analysis, where applicable,
using South Carolina and Fourth Circuit jurisprudence, to demonstrate
that similar conclusions would likely be reached if the parallel
provisions found in South Carolina's immigration bill were challenged
in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
1. THE SEVERABILITY CLAUSE - SECTION 12(A) OF S.B. 1070
The District Court correctly declined to enjoin the entire
immigration bill because of the severability clause found in S.B. 1070 §
12(A). Arizona state law principles control severability analysis, and
Arizona courts may only strike down an entire statute as
unconstitutional if the unconstitutional parts cannot be severed from the
constitutional parts.1 8 The courts must look at the legislative intent and
give effect to the severability clause if parts of the statute are valid and
enforceable apart from, and independent of, the unconstitutional parts. 19
The Court wisely found that the Arizona legislature had intended to
preserve the constitutional provisions of the Act via the severability
clause and that independent, severable constitutional provisions existed
in the Act. 20 Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that the
entire Act should not be enjoined and that the constitutionality of each
provision would have to be assessed individually. 21
Similar to the Arizona Act, South Carolina's pending
immigration reform bill, H.B. 4919, contains a severability clause.22
1 Id. at 992 (citing Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 886
(9th Cir. 2008); State v. Ramsey, 831 P.2d 408, 413 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)).
'9 Id. at 992-93 (citing Selective Life Ins. Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 422 P.2d 710, 715 (Ariz. 1967)).
20 Id. at 993 (citing S.B. 1070 § 12(A)).
21 id
22 H. 4919 § 5, 2010 Gen. Assem., 118th Sess. (S.C. 2010). Henceforth, I
will refer to the S.C. immigration reform bill as "the S.C. Bill." The S.C. Bill
was introduced on April 29, 2010. It has not been passed by the S.C. General
Assembly, but it is expected to be considered for passage during the 119th
(2011-2012) legislative session. Section 5 of this Bill states the following: "If
any Section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or
word of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or invalid, such
holding shall not affect the constitutionality or validity of the remaining
portions of this act ..... This language is similar to, but more specific than,
Arizona's S.B. 1070 § 12(A), which states the following: "If a provision of this
act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
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South Carolina, like Arizona, has held that severability of a statute is a
question of state law.23 Also like Arizona, South Carolina has
recognized that a statute may be constitutional in part while being
unconstitutional in part; the court will enforce the constitutional part if
it is independent of the unconstitutional part.24 Therefore, any court
assessing the constitutionality of the S.C. Bill would have to respect its
severability clause, as the Arizona District Court did with S.B. 1070,
and assess the constitutionality of each individual provision.
2. HUMAN SMUGGLING STATUTE - SECTION 4 OF S.B. 1070:
AMENDMENT TO A.R.S. § 13-2319
The District Court correctly found that the United States was
unlikely to succeed in claiming that federal law preempted S.B. 1070 §
4. The District Court reasoned that the United States did not
specifically challenge the minor change made to the preexisting
statute, 25 and the preexisting statute itself did not warrant an
injunction.26 This author agrees completely and will not offer any
comments as to the S.C. Bill because South Carolina is not a border
State and therefore did not have to address human smuggling in its
immigration reform bill.
3. EMPLOYMENT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS - SECTION 5 OF S.B.
1070: A.R.S. § 13-2928(C)
The District Court appropriately found that the United States
would likely succeed with its claim that S.B. 1070 § 5: A.R.S. § 13-
2928(C) conflicted with a comprehensive federal scheme and should
thus be preempted.2 ' A.R.S. § 13-2928(C) states that "[i]t is unlawful
for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and who is
an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of this act are severable."
23 South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. United Oil Marketers, Inc., 306 S.C.
384, 388, 412 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1991) (citing Fairway Ford, Inc. v. Timmons,
281 S.C. 57, 314 S.E.2d 322 (1984)).
24 Knotts v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 348 S.C. 1, 9-10, 558 S.E.2d 511,
515 (2002).
25 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d.at 989.
26 Id. at 1000.
27 Id. at 1002.
2010] EAGLE VERSUS PHOENIX: 115
A TALE OF FEDERALISM
public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor
in this State."2 The Court correctly pointed out that "States possess
broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State." 29 But the Court also
noted that in preemption cases where Congress has legislated in areas
traditionally controlled by the States, a presumption against preemption
by the federal government can be overcome by the "clear manifest
purpose of Congress" to supersede the "police powers of the State."30
The Court further noted that when there is an "extant action" by
Congress, there can arise "an inference of pre-emption [sic] in an
unregulated segment of an otherwise regulated field."3
The District Court properly concluded that Congress created a
comprehensive federal scheme that regulated the area of employment
dealing with immigration status verification when it passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).32  Under the IRCA,
Congress established penalties for employers who directly, or indirectly
through contractors or subcontractors, and knowingly hire, continue to
employ, or refer for employment unauthorized aliens.33 The IRCA has
also established a mandatory employment verification system.34 The
District Court also correctly observed that Congress did not seek to
specifically punish the act of working without authorization because it
28 A.R.S. § 13-2928(C) (2010).
29 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1000 (quoting De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)).
30 Id. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, ---U.S., ---- , ---- , 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95
(2009)).
31 Id at 1001. (quoting P.R. Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum
Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 504 (1988)).
2 Id. at 1002.
3 Id at 1001 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)-(2), (4), (e)(4) (2010)).
34 Id. at 1001. The federal government's mandatory employment
verification system requires all employees to complete a Form 1-9, the
Employment Eligibility Verification Form, and present to the employer the
forms of identification specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B), or (C) and (D)
(2010). 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The federal government, through
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in partnership with the Social
Security Administration (SSA), also provides an Internet-based system called
"E-Verify" to employers at no charge. Department of Homeland Security, E-
Verify, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc1 185221678150.shtm (last
visited August 10, 2010). As of September 8, 2009, all employers with federal
contracts or subcontracts must use E-Verify, but it is otherwise optional for
employers. Id. The E-Verify system compares the information provided on a
Form 1-9 with more than 455 million records in the SSA's database and more
than 80 million in Homeland Security immigration databases. Id.
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expressly limited the use of information on the Form 1-9, including the
attestation of the employee that he or she is authorized to work in the
U.S., to enforcement of "this chapter [8 U.S.C. § 1324] and Sections
1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18" of the U.S. Criminal Code,
none of which create a crime for working without authorization.35
Thus, Congress took "extant actions" to regulate in the area of
employment of unauthorized aliens by sanctioning employers and, in a
limited fashion, penalizing employees.36 Because Congress chose to
list a number of penalties for unauthorized alien employees associated
with their employment but not for the act of working without
authorization, it can be inferred that the federal government chose not
to penalize that act, and thus it preempted Arizona from making that act
a crime.37
Although the District Court was correct in its conclusion that
Arizona's criminalization of the act of working without authorization
was likely unconstitutional, it is worth reiterating that employers in the
States are still required to obtain and maintain employment verification
38
forms and associated documentation, employers are free to send the
federal government requests for the immigration status of their
employees through E-verify at no cost to them, 39 and unauthorized
3 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1001 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(b)(2), (5) (2010)). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a) (making it a federal
crime to, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government, (1)
falsify, conceal, or cover up any material fact; (2) knowingly make or use a
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement; or (3) make or use any false
writing or document); 1028(a) (making it a federal crime to, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the federal government, knowingly make, use, or
transfer a false or stolen identification document, an identification document
belonging to another person, or any implement or feature for use in creating a
false identification document); 1546 (making it a federal crime to, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the federal government, (a) forge or falsify an
immigration document; or (b) use a false identification document, a document
not properly issued to the user, or a false attestation); 1621 (making it a federal
crime to, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government,
commit perjury by knowingly make a false statement after taking an oath to tell
the truth during a proceeding or on any document signed under penalty of
perjury).
36 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 100 1-02.
31Id. at 1002.
3 Form 1-9, supra note 34b.
39 E-verify, supra note 34c. It is worth noting that after December 31,
2007, Arizona began requiring E-Verify and, in Section 8 of S.B. 1070:
Amendment to A.R.S. § 23-214, requires employers to "keep a record of the
verification for the duration of the employee's employment or at least three
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employees are subject to civil and criminal penalties associated with
their applications for employment. 40 States are also allowed to pass
laws forbidding employers to hire unauthorized aliens, as affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in De Canas v. Bica, which upheld
California's law prohibiting the knowing employment by California
employers of unauthorized aliens.41 In that case, the Court concluded
that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allowed "room for state
legislation," and California's legislation did not "'stand[] as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress"' in passing the Act.42 Arizona's ban on
knowingly or intentionally employing unauthorized aliens is covered
by Section 7 of S.B. 1070 and Section 8 of S.B. 1070, respectively, but
neither provision was included in the federal government's complaint.43
Section 3(C) of the S.C. Bill is identical to Section 13-2928(C) of
the Arizona Act." Although there appears to be no case on point in the
Fourth Circuit, a challenge to Section 3(C) of the S.C. Bill in the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina would likely have the
same outcome as the challenge to Section 13-2928(C) because the
reasoning employed by the Arizona District Court was sound. By the
same token, South Carolina's employment regulations mandating
verification of the immigration status of all employees by employers
would likely be upheld, for the same reasons discussed in the
immediately preceding paragraph.45
years, whichever is longer." This Section was not challenged by the federal
government in its complaint.
40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2) (2010).
41 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
42 Id at 363 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
43 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986. The only amendments
in Sections 7 and 8 are for the creation for employers of an affirmative defense
of entrapment. See S.B. 1070, Section 7: Amendment to A.R.S. § 23-212 and
S.B. 1070, Section 8: Amendment to A.R.S. § 23-214.
4 Compare S.C. Bill, supra note 22a, at § 3(C) with A.R.S. § 13-2928(C),
supra note 28.
45 S.C. Code Ann. § 41-8-30 (2010) mandates that no private employer
shall "knowingly or intentionally employ an unauthorized alien." Under § 41-
8-20(B)-(C), as of July 1, 2010, South Carolina requires all businesses not only
to complete and maintain the federal Form 1-9, but must also, within five
business days after employing a new employee, either: 1. Verify the
employee's status using E-Verify; or 2. Verify that the employee has a valid
S.C. driver's license or valid ID card from the DMV, or that they are eligible to
obtain either, or that they possess either a valid driver's license or valid ID card
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4. TRANSPORTATION, CONCEALING, HARBORING, OR
SHIELDING OF ILLEGAL ALIENS, OR ENCOURAGING OR
INDUCING THEM TO COME TO OR LIVE IN ARIZONA -
SECTION 5 OF S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 13-2929
The District Court divided its discussion into two parts according
to the two grounds upon which the United States argued the
unconstitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-2929: (A) the provision was
preempted as an impermissible regulation of immigration; and (B) it
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
a. Regulation of Immigration
The District Court, through solid analysis, reasonably concluded
that the United States would be unlikely to succeed in its claim that
Section 5 of S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 13-2929 was an impermissible attempt
to regulate immigration or that the provision violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.46 The provision states that it is illegal "for a person
who is in violation of a criminal offense to: 1. transport or move or
attempt to transport or move an alien in [Arizona], in furtherance of the
[alien's unlawful] presence in the United States...; 2. conceal, harbor,
or shield... an alien from detection in [Arizona]...; [and] 3. encourage
or induce an alien to come to or [live in Arizona]...."' The violator
must knowingly or recklessly disregard the fact that the alien has
illegally entered or remains in the U.S.48
The District Court properly pointed out that regulation of
immigration is "'essentially a determination [by the federal
government] of who should or should not be admitted into the country,
and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain."' 49 The
Court also correctly noted that "'the fact that aliens are the subject of a
from another State with as strict requirements as S.C. The penalties or sanctions
for violations of the statute by employers is set forth in §§41-8-50 to -70. It is
worth noting that these provisions are already law and that South Carolina's H.
4919 bill does not contain any proposed amendments to these provisions.
46 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1004.
47 A.R.S. § 13-2929(A)(1)-(3) (2010) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
48 Id.
49 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1003 (quoting De Canas,
424 U.S. at 355).
2010] EAGLE VERSUS PHOENIX: 119
A TALE OF FEDERALISM
state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration."' 50 The
federal government argued first that A.R.S. § 13-2929 was an
impermissible regulation of immigration because "to the extent Section
5 is not a restriction on interstate movement, it is necessarily a
restriction on unlawful entry into the United States."5 However, the
Court simply, but accurately, found that A.R.S. § 13-2929 did not
"attempt to regulate who should or should not be admitted into the
United States," and it did not "regulate the conditions under which
legal entrants may remain in the United States."52
The Court noted that the United States argued in a footnote that
because A.R.S. § 13-2929 did not contain an exemption "for certain
religious groups for contact with volunteer ministers and missionaries,"
and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C), part of the federal alien smuggling
statute, did contain such an exemption, A.R.S. § 13-2929 directly
conflicted with the federal statute. However, the Court rejected this
argument because the Arizona statute was narrower than the federal
version, requiring that the violator of the statute "already be in violation
of a criminal offense."54 Because the federal government presented a
facial challenge to the statute, it would have had to demonstrate that no
circumstances could exist "under which the Act would be valid," which
the government was unable to do. 5 And, because the statute was
challenged facially, the Court could not go beyond the statute to find an
imaginary conflict between the two statutes. 56
South Carolina Code Annotated § 16-9-460, which is not
amended by the S.C. Bill, is very similar to A.R.S. § 13-2929. Section
16-9-460 does contain significant differences, but it, too, would likely
pass constitutional muster. First, South Carolina makes the acts
referred to in A.R.S. § 13-2929, such as knowingly or recklessly
50 Id (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355).
51 Id (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 45).
52 Id at 1003.
5 Id. at 1002 n.18 (citing Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
46 n.40).
54 Id. (citing A.R.S. § 13-2929). It is interesting that the Court followed
this narrow-statute rationale with respect to A.R.S. § 13-2929 but failed to even
mention it with respect to the first sentence of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070:
A.R.S. § 1051(B), which would require a violator to be in violation of some
other state or local offense before the violator's immigration status would be
checked. See infra pp. 37-38.
5 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1002 n.18 (citing United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745).
56 Id (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552
U.S. 442, 449-50).
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concealing or harboring an illegal alien, a felony, not a class I
misdemeanor.5 7 A second difference between the two statutes is that
South Carolina's version has a stiffer fine for violations: up to
$5,000.00 and/or up to 5 years in prison, as opposed to Arizona's fine
of at least $1,000.00 (per person if ten or more illegal aliens are
involved) and no prison time.5 8 Probably the most important difference
between the two, however, is that South Carolina's statute makes the
specified acts unlawful, regardless of whether the offender was in
violation of a criminal offense at the time the offender violated the
statute.59 Therefore, the South Carolina statute would not be narrower
than the federal version, and would thus seemingly fail to avoid a facial
challenge by the federal government, according to the Court's
analysis.6o However, whereas the South Carolina statute is broader
than its federal counterpart, the South Carolina statute, unlike the
Arizona statute, contains the exception found in the federal statute for
religious groups engaged in certain conduct, and in no way conflicts
with the federal statute. 61 Thus, the South Carolina version of the alien
transportation, concealing, harboring, and shielding statute would likely
pass constitutional muster.62
57 Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-460(B) with H.B. 2162: A.R.S. § 13-
2929(F).
58 Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-460(C) with H.B. 2162: A.R.S. § 13-
2929(F).
s9 Compare S.C. Code Ann. §16-9-460(A)-(B) with H.B. 2162: A.R.S. §
13-2929(F).
60 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1002 n.18.
61 Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-460(E)-(F) with 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(C).
62 It is worth noting that this S.C. bill also does not contain the language
used by Arizona in H.B. 2162, Section 3: A.R.S. § 11-1051(E), Section 4:
A.R.S. § 13-1509(B), and Section 6: A.R.S. § 13-2928(D), specifically "an
alien's immigration status may be determined by ... a law enforcement officer
who is authorized by the federal government to verify or ascertain an alien's
immigration status," and that the alien's immigration status may be determined
by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement or U.S. Customs and
Border Protection pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (note: this language was not
in S.B. 1070, Section 5: A.R.S. § 13-2929, either, but was later added by H.B.
2162). However, S.C.'s H.4919, Sect. 2: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-470(B) and
S.B. 1070, Section 3: A.R.S. § 13-509(B) do contain this language, although
S.B. 1070 originally used the word "shall" instead of "may." The importance of
this change, and the constitutional problem arising from it, will be discussed
infra Part I(B)(1). The United States did not challenge this Section, and thus
the Court did not address it; but, the government may challenge it in the future
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b. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The District Court employed sound analysis to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion when it rejected the United States' argument that
Arizona "'offend[ed] the [d]ormant Commerce Clause by restricting
the interstate movement of aliens."' 63 The Court correctly pointed out
that Congress has the sole power to regulate interstate commerce.
According to the doctrine of "dormant Commerce Clause," one of the
Commerce Clause's features is that it "denies the States the power [to]
unjustifiably... discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of
articles of commerce."
The Court also correctly stated the two-part analysis requirement
for the dormant Commerce Clause. The first part of the analysis
requires a determination of whether the dormant Commerce Clause
applies; and, the Court correctly noted that the dormant Commerce
Clause applies when States pass regulatory laws for an activity that
have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, "such that Congress
could regulate the activity." 66 The Court then accurately stated the
second part of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis - when "a state
statute implicates the dormant Commerce Clause," the Court must
determine "'whether [the statute] discriminates on its face against
interstate commerce.' 67 In this context, "discrimination" refers to
treating in-state economic interests beneficially while treating out-of-
state interests detrimentally.68 If the statute is nondiscriminatory, it
only violates the dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes a "clearly
against S.C. if it does not make the change, which is why this author will
discuss it.
63 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1003 (quoting Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 45).
6 Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3).
65 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)
(alteration in original).
66 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1003 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n
of Optometrists & Opticians LensCrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521, 524
(9th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Note that the
District Court cited to 567 F.3d 525 for the Brown citation, but this was an
error. The quotation is located on page 524, as indicated above.
67 Id. (quoting United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007)).
68 Id.
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excessive" burden on interstate commerce "in relation to the putative
local benefits."69
The Court prudently determined that the United States failed to
show how Arizona's provisions under A.R.S. § 13-2929 substantially
affected interstate commerce, i.e. how it implicated the dormant
Commerce Clause, given that those provisions merely prohibited the
same conduct prohibited by federal law and did not restrict, limit, or
otherwise regulate immigration. 70 The Court also wisely found that
A.R.S. § 13-2929 was nondiscriminatory because it did not distinguish
between "in-state and out-of-state economic interests" or benefit the in-
state interests at the expense of the out-of-state interests. Rather, the
putative local benefit of public safety far outweighed the burden, if any,
7'to interstate commerce.
South Carolina Code Annotated § 16-9-460, South Carolina's
version of A.R.S. § 13-2929, would likely pass the same constitutional
muster under the District Court's dormant Clause analysis. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Hovatter, set forth a two-tier
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, which was essentially the same
analysis used in the Arizona District Court's opinion. 72 In the first tier,
a court must look at "whether the state law discriminates against
interstate commerce." 73 If the state law is discriminatory, then it is
"virtually per se invalid," unless the discrimination is "demonstrably
justified by a factor unrelated to economic protectionism." 74 In the
absence of discrimination, a court must then move to the second tier
and determine whether the state law "unjustifiably . . . burden[s] the
interstate flow of articles of commerce."7 To make this determination,
a court must employ the Pike test, under which the state law will only
be overturned if the "burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
69 Id. (quoting United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
'old. at 1003.
71 Id. at 1004. It is worth noting here that the United States also
challenged Section 10 of S.B. 1070 because it was based on the state law
violations contained in Sections 4 and 5. However, because the Court found
that Sections 4 and 5 would likely not be preempted, it drew the same
conclusion as to Section 10. Id. at n.20.
72 561 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2009).
73 id
74 Id. (quoting Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338, 128 S.Ct.
1801, 1808 (2008)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
7s Id. (quoting Or. Waste, 511 U.S. at 98).
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clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."7 Because
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis employed by a South Carolina
district court would essentially be the same as that employed by the
Arizona District Court, South Carolina Code Annotated § 16-9-460
would likely be upheld as constitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
5. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
OF COMMISSION OF A PUBLIC OFFENSE MAKING SUSPECT
REMOVEABLE FROM THE UNITED STATES - SECTION 6 OF
S.B. 1070: AMENDMENT TO A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)
The District Court applied sound analysis to arrive at the correct
conclusion that the amendment to A.R.S. § 13-3883(A), found in
Section 6 of S.B. 1070, would likely be preempted by federal law.n
This amendment allows a law enforcement officer to make a
warrantless arrest if that officer has probable cause to believe that the
person arrested has committed "any public offense that makes the
person removable from the United States."7 8 Arizona law defines
"public offense" as:
conduct for which a sentence to a term of
imprisonment or of a fine is provided by any law of
the state in which it occurred or by any law,
regulation or ordinance of a political subdivision of
that state and, if the act occurred in a state other than
this state, it would be so punishable under the laws,
regulations or ordinances of this state or of a political
subdivision of this state if the act had occurred in this
state.
The Court noted that both Arizona and the United States intimated that
§13-3883(A)(5) allows for "the warrantless arrest of a person where
76 Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))
(alteration in original)(internal quotation marks omitted). The exact language
of the Pike test is as follows: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
397 U.S. at 142.
n United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1006.
7 A.R.S. § 3883(A)(5) (2010).
9Id. § 13-105(26).
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there is probable cause to believe the person committed a crime in
another state that would be considered a crime if it had been committed
in Arizona and that would subject the person to removal from the
United States., 80 The Court logically and correctly inferred from this
interpretation that Arizona state police officers would have to know
out-of-state laws and their relationship to Arizona's law.81 The Court
then convincingly asserted that the determination of an alien's
removability based on the alien's commission of a public offense was a
complex one 82 that state law enforcement officers were unable to
make83 and that could only be made by "immigration court judges and
federal appeals court judges." 84 The Court further noted that some
federal officials can "change the immigration consequences of the
commission of a public offense and cancel or suspend the removal of
an alien."85 The Court rejected Arizona's argument that its officers
80 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1005 (citing Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32-33; Hearing Transcript 46-48). The
Court speculated as to what the Arizona Legislature may have intended,
specifically that police could make a warrantless arrest of an alien "previously
convicted of a crime in Arizona but never referred to DHS for potential
removal proceedings." Id. The Court's speculative interpretation is irrelevant
and, to this author, contradictory to the plain meaning of the statutory provision
as enacted.
81 id.
82 Id. at 1005-06 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, --- U.S., ---- , ----, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
83 Id. at 1006 (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit
8, Declaration of Tony Estrada, Sheriff of Santa Cruz Cnty. % 8-9, Exhibit 9,
Declaration of Roberto Villasehlor, Chief of Police, Tucson Police Dep't 1 6).
84 Id. at 1005-1006.
85 Id. at 1005 (citing as examples 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a) (gives the U.S.
Attorney General the ability to cancel removal or adjust the status of an alien);
1253(a)(3) (court may suspend the sentence of, and release, an alien)). For an
illustration of the complexity of alien removability, and how judicial
determinations of removability based on the commission of public offenses and
the Attorney General's ability to cancel removal can intersect, i.e. for an
illustration that ties notes 81-84 together, see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47
(2006) (holding that the underlying conduct of a state conviction must be
punishable as a federal felony in order for the crime committed by an alien to
be considered an "aggravated felony" for the purpose of preventing the U.S.
Attorney General from being able to cancel removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(a)(3)); see also Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, --- U.S. ---------, 130 S.
Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding that where the state conviction is for a misdemeanor
drug offense that has not been enhanced by a prior conviction, it is not treated
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could contact the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
determine aliens' immigration statuses under A.R.S. § 11-1051,
because the provision does not make it mandatory for police to contact
DHS regarding removability, and it was unclear whether the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC)8 6 would be able to tell officers
whether the public offense committed by the alien made the alien
removable.
The District Court's analysis was sound."8  A.R.S. § 13-
3883(A)(5) would allow Arizona state law enforcement to act as law
enforcement of other states, as federal immigration and customs agents,
and even as federal judges. Thus, this provision would give Arizona
police far too much discretion. The S.C. Bill would, under § 23-3-
1300, give South Carolina law enforcement similar powers. 89 Although
the S.C. Bill would not allow law enforcement to make warrantless
arrests of aliens who they had probable cause to believe had committed
"public offenses," they would still be allowed to make warrantless
as a felony conviction under the Controlled Substances Act, 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(2), for purposes of an "aggravated felony" under § 1229b(a)(3)).
86 LESC is a continually-operating national support center administered by
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is an agency under
DHS. LESC responds to inquiries from state and local law enforcement about
aliens that officers encounter during their enforcement duties. LESC also
responds to inquires from federal and state correctional and court systems
concerning aliens in their custody. U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support Center, http://www.ice.gov/lesc/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2010).
87 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1006 n.21.
88 Though the Court's analysis of this provision was sound, the Court may
have erred in not enjoining A.R.S. §11-1051(D), which deals with
transportation by state officers of aliens to in state and out-of-state federal
facilities. The problem with this provision is that state officers arguably need
the authorization from the Attorney General of the United States, not from a
judge, to transport aliens to facilities that are outside of that State's lines.
According to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2010), notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. § 1342,
only those officers of States or political subdivisions who are "determined by
the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in
the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines
to detention centers), may carry out such function[s] . . ." and only pursuant to
a written agreement to that effect between the Attorney General and those
States or subdivisions) (emphasis added). This would also invalidate South
Carolina's proposed S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1300(B), which is nearly identical
to A.R.S. § 11-1051(D). See infra note 91b.
89 See S.C. Bill, supra note 22a, at Section 1: § 23-3-1300(A).
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arrests of persons who law enforcement had probable cause to believe
"ha[d] committed an offense which [made] the person removable from
the United States." 90
This part of § 23-3-1300(A) would likely be preempted by
federal law for most of the reasons provided in the District Court's
analysis, 91 and because state law enforcement cannot perform the
functions of federal immigration and customs agents without
authorization from the Attorney General of the United States.92 Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Sosa-
Carabantes, acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) established a
program that "permit[ted] [U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement] to deputize local law enforcement officers to perform
immigration enforcement activities pursuant to a written agreement"
and that these deputized local enforcement agents were subject to the
90 Id. The only difference between this provision in the S.C. Bill and its
S.B. 1070 counterpart is that S.C. law enforcement would not be able to go so
far as to make a warrantless arrest of someone who they had probable cause to
believe committed a crime in another state that would be a crime if committed
in South Carolina, and that would make them removable from the United
States. However, the S.C. Bill would still require S.C. law enforcement to
decide whether acts committed in South Carolina were removable offenses.
91 The only part of the Court's analysis that would not apply to the S.C.
provision would be the inability of one State's law enforcement officers to
know the laws of other States (S.C.'s provision does not contain the "public
offenses" Section, so this part of the analysis is inapplicable). Also, the reason
why only part of § 23-3-1300(A) would be preempted is because H. 4919 has a
severability clause in Section 5.
92 See 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2010) (stating that officers or employees of the
federal government cannot accept voluntary services [from officers of States or
political subdivisions] for the federal government or "employ personal services
exceeding that authorized by law except for emergencies involving the safety
of human life or the protection of property," which does not include "ongoing,
regular functions of government the suspension of which would not imminently
threaten the safety of human life or the protection of property"); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), supra note 88c; see also id. § 1357(g)(2) (requiring that
the agreement between the Attorney General and States or subdivisions
"contain a written certification that the officers or employees performing the
function under the agreement . . . received adequate training regarding the
enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws" and that those officers or
employees "ha[d] knowledge of, and adhere[d] to, Federal law relating to
the[ir] function [under the agreement]") (emphasis added); see also id. §
1357(g)(3) (mandating that all officers or employees of a State or political
subdivision functioning under § 1357 be "subject to the direction and
supervision of the Attorney General") (emphasis added).
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supervision of the Attorney General of the United States. Under the §
23-3-1300(A) scheme, no deputizing would be required because S.C.
law enforcement agents would be dual agents by default. However,
because this part of § 23-3-1300(A) would directly conflict with
Congress's purpose in regulating this area, it will likely be preempted
by federal law.94
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REASONABLE CONCLUSION BASED
ON QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS
Section 3 of S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 13-1509 created a state
immigration registration scheme identical to that of the federal
government. The only difference was in the penalty imposed:
Arizona's penalty was less severe than that imposed by the federal
government. The Court discussed whether this difference in penalties
for violation of the immigration registration statutes would prove to be
an obstacle to the federal registration scheme. This author agrees with
the Court's conclusion that it would pose such an obstacle but
disagrees, at least in part, with how the Court arrived at its conclusion.
1. WILLFUL FAILURE TO COMPLETE OR CARRY AN ALIEN
REGISTRATION DOCUMENT IF THE PERSON IS IN
VIOLATION OF 8 [U.S.C. §§] 1304(e) OR 1306(a) - SECTION 3 OF
S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 13-1509
Section 3 provides that "a person is guilty of willful failure to
complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in
violation of 8 [U.S.C. §§] 1304(e) or 1306(a)." 95 "Violation of this
section is a class I misdemeanor" and carries a maximum fine of $100
and a maximum of 20 days in jail for a first offense.96 A subsequent
" 561 F.3d 256, 257 (4th Cir. 2009).
94 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
95 A.R.S. § 13-1509(A). Though 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a) will be
discussed later, a brief introduction to them is in order here. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e)
(2010) requires all aliens, eighteen years and older, to carry in their personal
possession an alien registration certificate or alien registration receipt card; and
the statute imposes penalties for a violation thereof. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2010)
makes it a misdemeanor for an alien who is required to apply for registration
and be fingerprinted to willfully fail or refuse to so apply or be fingerprinted;
and the statute imposes penalties for a violation thereof.
96 A.R.S. § 13-1509(H).
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offense carries up to 30 days in jail. In either case, the violator must
pay jail costs.98 Also, except under specified circumstances, Section 3
eliminates violators' eligibility for "suspension of sentence, probation,
pardon, commutation of sentence, or release from confinement on any
basis . . . ."9 The Court accurately summed up Section 3 as making
violations of federal immigration registration laws state crimes subject
to state penalties. 00 The United States opposed Section 3 by arguing,
among other reasons, that "it interfere[s] with comprehensive federal
alien registration law."'10  Arizona contended that "it neither
conflict[ed] with federal law nor regulat[ed] in a federally occupied
field." 02
The District Court correctly quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hines as saying, "the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and register
aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously existing
concurrent power of state and nation[;] . . . whatever power a state may
have is subordinate to supreme national law."'o3 It also correctly
quoted the Court in Hines as saying that the Federal Alien Registration
Act's purpose was to "make a harmonious whole" and that it "provided
a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all-embracing
system."' 04 However, the District Court also chose a more curious
quote from the Hines Court:
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a
complete scheme of regulation and has therein
provided a standard for the registration of aliens,
states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or
auxiliary regulations. 05
Though the District Court recognized that the INA is not "so
comprehensive that it leaves no room for state action that impacts
97 d.
" Id § 13-1509(E).
99 Id. § 13-1509(D).
1oo United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 998.
1o1 Id. (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 34-39).
102 Id. (citing Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 21-22.)
103 Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 68) (alteration in original).
' Id at 999 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72, 74).
'0' Id at 998-999 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67).
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aliens,"' 0 it again referred to the Hines Court's determination that the
whole alien registration scheme forbids states to enact laws that conflict
with or complement the federal law. i07
The only problem with the Court's analysis is that it fails to
explain how Arizona's law, which mirrors the federal law in terms of
its registration requirements, is inconsistent with Congress's purpose. 08
The Hines Court defined the purpose of the Alien Registration Act as
follows: "to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through
one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free from
the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance . . . ."109
Unlike Hines, this case involved identical state and local registration
requirements. The state and federal law each contained a criminal
offense for willful failure or refusal to apply for registration and to
submit to fingerprinting, and a separate offense for failure to carry an
alien registration certificate or receipt.'10 The only difference between
the state and federal law in this case is in their penalty provisions. It is
difficult to see how Congress' purpose would be undermined when the
registration requirements are the same; the national registration system
would still be uniform. The real question then becomes whether the
difference in penalties constitutes inconsistency with Congress's
purpose under the INA per the Hines Court's opinion.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), willful failure or refusal to apply for
registration and be fingerprinted when that application and
fingerprinting are required is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of no
more than $1,000.00, imprisonment for no more than six months, or
both."' Under 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e), failure of an alien eighteen years or
older to carry an alien registration certificate or alien registration
receipt is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of no more than
$100.00, imprisonment for no more than thirty days, or both for each
conviction. 112 Section 3 lists these two violations in one subsection,
(A); and, under subsection (H), each is a class 1 misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of no more than $100.00, and no more than twenty
106 Id. at 999 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 358).
107 Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67).
"08 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67.
'o9 Id at 74.
110 Compare id at 60-61 with United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at
998 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1509(A), (H)).
"' 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2010).
112 Id. § 1304(e) (2010).
130 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
days in jail for a first offense and no more than thirty days in jail for
subsequent offenses." 3
Because the registration requirements are the same as the federal
ones, and Arizona's penalties would come into play only after
adjudication, targeting and harassment of law-abiding aliens by police
would not be an issue. And, looking at the District Court's analysis, it
remains to be seen how Arizona's different penalty alone, which is
actually more lenient than that under the federal statutes, would
frustrate Congress's purpose of "provid[ing] a standard for alien
registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system in order to
obtain the information deemed to be desirable in connection with
aliens."Il 4 Further, the lesser penalty imposed by the Arizona statute
seems to be consistent with Congress' legislative intent in approving
the Alien Registration Act, for the Hines Court, in a footnote, cited
comments from a congressman, who indicated that the [Alien
Registration Act] passed because "the punishment [was] not too great"
and "some of the harshness and . . . severity of the original bill ha[d]
been eliminated."'" 5 Thus, the District Court's analysis seems to have
some holes. Then again, the Supreme Court has not yet dealt squarely
with this precise issue (identical state and federal regulations, only with
differing penalties) in the context of immigration registration.116
A more appropriate quote from Hines that the District Court
could have used in its analysis would have been the following:
[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended
and intertwined with responsibilities of the national
government that where it acts, and the state also acts
on the same subject, the act of Congress, or the
treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield to it.'' 7
This quotation explains why the regulation of aliens is an area of
immigration law that Congress has set aside for itself. The quotation
also clearly says that "the act of Congress" (which would include the
"3 S.B. 1070, Section 3: A.R.S. § 13-1509(A), (H).
114 Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
" Id. at n.37 (quoting CONG. REC., June 22, 1940, pp. 13468-9).
116 The Hines case did involve state law penalties that were different from,
and even less severe than, the federal penalty. However, the difference in
severity between the respective penalties was not addressed by the Court.
" Hines, 312 U.S. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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penalty provisions) trumps "the law of the state" (which would likewise
include the penalty provisions).
The District Court could also have found that Congress' purpose,
which the Supreme Court said was to create a uniform registration
system "in order to obtain the information deemed to be desirable in
connection with aliens,"" 8 was reflected in the more severe punishment
for willfully failing or refusing to register and be fingerprinted, as
opposed to not carrying the alien registration certificate or receipt
(emphasis added).' 19 Here, Arizona made the punishment the same for
both offenses,120 thereby eliminating the distinction between the two
offenses in terms of penalty and removing the heightened penalty (and
its deterrent effect) for violation of the application-and-fingerprinting
requirement. Because Arizona removed the heightened penalty for
violation of the application-and-fingerprinting requirement, which
serves a greater role in achieving Congress's ultimate purpose (to
collect information on aliens), Section 3(A), (H) is inconsistent with
Congress' purpose and frustrates Congress's regulatory scheme. Thus,
Section 3(A), (H) will likely be preempted.12 '
The District Court could have focused its criticism on the fact
that Section 3(B) used the word "may" instead of "shall" in reference to
determination of immigration status by "(1) [a] law enforcement officer
who is authorized by the federal government to verify or ascertain an
"' Id. at 74.
119 It is worth noting that this disparity in punishment between the two
offenses, at least under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 (e), 1306(a), did not exist at the time
of Hines because failure to carry the registration receipt or certificate was not a
federal criminal offense at the time, although Pennsylvania's law did include it
as a separate, lesser charge. See id. at 60-61.
120 See supra note 113.
121 Because the District Court did not discuss subsection (D) (in H.B.
2162), and because it would not serve as a basis for preemption, this author will
not discuss it in depth but will only mention that it makes no sense. It purports
to make a convicted violator of Section 3 ineligible "for suspension of
sentence, probation, pardon, commutation of sentence, or release from
confinement," except under specific circumstances, "until the sentence imposed
by the court has been served or the person is eligible for release pursuant to"
another specified provision of law. The part of this provision that is
particularly troubling is the inclusion of the phrase "until the sentence imposed
... has been served," because the person cannot be eligible for suspension of
sentence, probation, etc. if the sentence has already been served. Thus, this
phrase should never have been included in the provision. This same strange
provision is included as subsection (C) in South Carolina's proposed S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-9-470 (2010).
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alien's immigration status [; or] (2) [t]he United States immigration and
customs enforcement or the United States customs and border
protection pursuant to 8 [U.S.C. §] 1373(c)."22 The significance of
this permissive language is that it would allow others not mentioned in
(1) or (2), such as state law enforcement unauthorized by the U.S.
Attorney General to determine a person's immigration status. State law
enforcement agencies or officials, however, do not have the authority to
make a determination of a person's immigration status and can only
make requests of DHS to ascertain or verify a person's immigration
status.123 Otherwise, state law enforcement officials would become
dual agents by default, possessing inherent power to serve the roles of
federal immigration officers by making final determinations of who is
lawfully in the United States, while also serving their concurrent role of
state law enforcement. Thus, state law enforcement would have too
much discretion, which was the same problem created by A.R.S. § 13-
3883(A)(5), as discussed supra Section (A)(5). Therefore, the District
Court could have used this position as grounds for its correct
conclusion that Section 3 would likely be preempted.
South Carolina's parallel provision is the proposed South
Carolina Code Annotated § 16-9-470.124 This provision has a greater
chance of being preempted by federal law because it is drafted more
poorly than Arizona's Section 3. Not only does § 16-9-470 contain the
same "may" permissive language as Arizona's Section 3(B), discussed
in the preceding paragraph, but it also contains far harsher penalties
than those imposed by Arizona and potentially the federal government.
Specifically, subsection (D)(1) imposes, in addition to jail costs, "not
less than five hundred dollars" for a first offense; and subsection (D)(2)
imposes "not less than one thousand dollars" for subsequent
offenses. Because § 16-9-470, like Section 3(B)(H), fails to set
separate fines for the offenses of willful failure or refusal to register
and failure to carry an alien registration certificate or receipt, the fine
for a violation for failure to carry an alien registration certificate or
receipt would far exceed Congress's maximum fine of $100.126 And
with either of these offenses, the penalty under South Carolina's law
could soar to unknown heights because of the key phrase "not less
122 A.R.S. § 13-1509(B) (2010). It is worth noting that "shall" was in the
original language of S.B. 1070, but was later changed in H.B. 2162.
123 See supra note 92; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2010).
124 S.C. Bill, supra note 22a, at Section 2: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-470
(2010).
125 Id. § 16-9-470(D)(1), (2).
126 Compare id. with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a).
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than," which this author interprets as "at least."1 27 In addition, § 16-9-
470 contains subsection (G), under which a violation of the provision
would be a misdemeanor, but would become a felony if committed in
connection with other various state law crimes.128 Thus, § 16-9-470
will likely be preempted by federal law because state law enforcement
"may" make immigration status determinations and check for alien
registration compliance under this provision, without any limitations or
restrictions on how to decide who to check, 129 which could lead to
racial profiling and harassment of law-abiding aliens, 30 and could
provide a possible backdoor for police to search for drugs, chemicals,
weapons, etc. on alien suspects without having to have even reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
C THE DISTRICT COURT'S TROUBLESOME CONCLUSIONS
BASED ON QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) is amongst the
most controversial of S.B. 1070 and, unsurprisingly, the District
Court's analysis concerning this provision is equally controversial.
This author disagrees with the District Court's opinion as pertaining to
this provision, both in terms of the conclusion reached by the Court and
most of the analysis employed by the Court to arrive at this conclusion.
127 See supra note 22a, at (D)(1),(2).
128 Id. § 16-9-470(G)(1), (2). It is worth noting that the language of
subsection (G) mirrors the language that was originally in S.B. 1070 but later
removed by H.B. 2162. Compare id. with S.B. 1070, Section 3: § 13-
1509(G)(1), (2).
129 See supra note 22a, at § 16-9-470(A)-(B).
130 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
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1. DETERMINATION OF IMMIGRATION STATUS OF SUSPECT
PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL STOP, DETENTION, OR ARREST,
BASED UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION OF UNLAWFUL
PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES; MANDATORY
IMMIGRATION STATUS DETERMINATION FOLLOWING AN
ARREST - SECTION 2(B) OF S.B. 1070: A.R.S. § 11-1051(B)
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 states the following:
For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by [an
Arizona] law enforcement official or . . . law
enforcement agency . . . in the enforcement of any
other law or ordinance of a county, city or town of
this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the
United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made,
when practicable, to determine the immigration status
of the person, except if the determination may hinder
or obstruct an investigation. Any person who is
arrested shall have the person's immigration status
determined before the person is released.13 1
The provision also provides as follows:
A person is presumed to not be an alien who is
unlawfully present in the United States if the person
provides to the law enforcement officer or agency
any of the following: (1) [a] valid Arizona driver [sic]
license[;] (2) [a] valid Arizona nonoperating
identification license[;] (3) [a] valid tribal enrollment
card or other form of tribal identification[;] [or] [i]f
the entity requires proof of legal presence in the
United States before issuance, any valid United
States federal, state or local government issued
identification. 132
The District Court divided its analysis of this provision into two
sections, one section analyzing the second sentence of the provision
and the other section analyzing the first sentence of the provision. The
following discussion will progress accordingly.
"'A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) (2010). This author will refer to A.R.S. § 11-
105 1(B) and S.B. 1070, Section 2(B) interchangeably.
132 id.
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a. Mandatory Immigration Status Determination upon Arrest
The Court began its analysis by comparing the language used in
the original text of S.B. 1070 with the amended text in H.B. 2162. The
Court correctly noted that the original S.B. 1070, Section 2(B) text
began with "For any lawful contact" but was changed in H.B. 2162,
Section 3(B) to read "For any lawful stop, detention or arrbst."l 33 The
Court also correctly stated that in both provisions, the second sentence
was the same: "Any person who is arrested shall have the person's
immigration status determined before the person is released."1 34
However, the Court then proceeded to interpret the lack of change in
the second sentence as legislative intent to keep the first two sentences
independent of one another and to keep the second sentence's meaning
the same.135
Arizona conceded that in both S.B. 1070 and H.B. 2162, the
language of Section 2(B) was poorly drafted.136 However, the logical
interpretation, or plain meaning, of Section 2(B) is that the phrase "any
person who is arrested," referred to in the second sentence, should
mean any person who is arrested under that subsection, which would
be those arrests made "in the enforcement of any other law or
ordinance of a county, city or town of [Arizona]" where there also
existed reasonable suspicion that the suspect was an "alien and . . .
unlawfully present in the United States."1 37 The Court's logic was that
the first sentence in the original S.B. 1070 did not contain the word
"arrest," so the first two sentences were independent.13 8 The Court
furthered this logic by reasoning that since the Legislature did not
change the second sentence and only changed the first sentence from
"any lawful contact" to "any lawful stop, detention or arrest," the
Legislature clearly did not intend to change the meaning of the second
sentence. 139 What the Court failed to consider, however, was that one
of the reasons why the Legislature may have changed "any lawful
contact" to a phrase that included the word "arrest," and why it further
elaborated in the first sentence on the type of arrest, i.e. one that was
for a pre-existing lawful purpose but that also gave the officer
' Compare S.B. 1070, Section 2(B) with H.B. 2162, Section 3(B).
134 Id.
135 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
136 Id. at n.5 (citing Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 10.)
13. H.B. 2162, Section 3(B).
138 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
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reasonable suspicion that they were illegal aliens, is that the Legislature
was more clearly joining the first and second sentence by elaborating in
the first sentence on what it meant by "arrest" in the second sentence.
Thus, contrary to the Court's logic, the Legislature's change of
"lawful contact" to "lawful stop, detention or arrest" actually ties the
first two sentences together by linking "arrest" in the first sentence with
"arrest" in the second sentence. And, because the nature of the arrest
was also elaborated on in the other change made to the first sentence, it
made it unnecessary to define "arrest" in the second sentence. What
the Court failed to mention was that the phrase "in the enforcement of
any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town of this state" was
also not in S.B. 1070 but was added by H.B. 2162,140 likely as a
clarification that the arrests referred to were not being made because
the person was an alien unlawfully present in the United States but that
the suspicion of their unlawful presence was in addition to some pre-
existing lawful reason for arresting the suspect, i.e. for a violation of a
local or state crime. As Arizona argued to the Court, "[TJhe Arizona
Legislature could not have intended to compel Arizona's law
enforcement officers to determine and verify the immigration status of
every single person arrested - even for United States citizens and when
there is absolutely no reason to believe the person is unlawfully present
in the country."l 4 1 This is why Section 2(B) further reduced the class of
arrestees whose immigration status would be checked by placing after
the arrestee-status-verification clause the clause creating the
presumption of lawful presence in the United States based on one the
four specified forms of identification.142
Because the Court proceeded to read the second sentence of
Section 2(B) independently from the first sentence, its analysis that
followed was also questionable. For instance, the Court reasoned that
the forms of identification that would create a presumption of lawful
presence in the United States would only apply to the first sentence
because only the first sentence mentioned "unlawful presence," and
because any person arrested would have to have their immigration
status checked before being released; so it would not matter whether
the arrestee produced any of the four forms of identification.143 As the
140 Supra note 133.
141 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994 (quoting Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10.)
142 See S.B. 1070(2)(B) (as amended by H.B. 2162, Section 3(B)).
143 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
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Court put it, "[a] presumption against unlawful presence would not
dispose of the requirement that immigration status be checked ....
The problem with this reasoning, in addition to its basis on a
flawed presumption as to the independence of the first two sentences, is
that the reasoning ignores the fact that the lawful presence presumption
clause is part of the same subsection as the arrestee immigration
verification clause (second sentence) and the lawful stop, detention or
arrest clause (first sentence). The reasoning also ignores the fact that
the lawful presence presumption clause does not immediately follow
the first sentence. Had the Legislature intended the lawful presence
presumption clause to modify only the first sentence, then it surely
would have included it immediately afterwards and likely in a separate
clause. Even if, arguendo, the Court was correct, that the first two
sentences are independent and the lawful presence presumption clause
only applies to the first sentence of Section 2(B), the presumption
would still apply to arrests because the first sentence covers persons
subject to "any lawful stop, detention, or arrest" (emphasis added).145
The fundamental problem with the Court's logic is that it failed to add
up the changes made by the Legislature in H.B. 2162 and view those
changes together with the preexisting text.
The flawed foundation of the Court's analysis also caused it to
accept the United States' position that requisite determination of
immigration status for all arrestees "conflicts with the federal law
because it necessarily imposes substantial burdens on lawful
immigrants in a way that frustrates the concern of Congress for
nationally-uniform rules governing the treatment of aliens throughout
the country - rules designed to ensure 'our traditional policy of not
treating aliens as a thing apart' (emphasis added).146 The Court also
pointed out that Congress "manifested a purpose to [regulate
immigration] in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-
abiding aliens through one uniform national .. . system[] and to leave
them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police
surveillance" (emphasis added).147 The District Court therefore
concluded that if Arizona law enforcement had to determine the
144 id
145 See supra note 137. It is worth noting that this author focuses only on
"arrest" in the first sentence and not "stop" and "detention" because the focus
here is to demonstrate the connection between the first and second sentence,
which is through "arrest."
146 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994 (quoting Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 73)).
14 7 Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 74).
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immigration status of every person arrested, it would "burden[]
lawfully-present aliens because their liberty will be restricted while
their status is checked[,J" and "detention time for this category of
arrestee will certainly be extended during an immigration status
verification" (emphasis added).148 According to the Court, Section
2(B) of S.B. 1070 would require all arrestees to "prove their
immigration status to the satisfaction of state authorities, thus
increasing the intrusion of police presence into the lives of legally-
present aliens (and even United States citizens), who will necessarily
be swept up by this requirement" (emphasis added).149
A number of problems exist with the Court's analysis here. First,
the Court (and the United States) misapplied the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hines. The Hines Court determined that Congress' purpose
in passing the Alien Registration Act of 1940 was to create a "uniform
national registration system" that would "protect the personal liberties
of law-abiding aliens" and free them from being harassed by the police
through continuous "inquisitorial practices" and "surveillance"
(emphasis added).150 Congress was clearly concerned that law-abiding
aliens would be targeted and harassed by law enforcement based on
their status as aliens. The Hines Court echoed this concern in its
comment that "opposition to laws permitting invasion of the personal
liberties of law-abiding individuals, or singling out aliens as
particularly dangerous and undesirable groups, is deep-seated in this
country" (emphasis added)."'
The District Court in this case very subtly and craftily changed a
key word in the Supreme Court's Hines opinion - "law-abiding" - and
replaced it with the word "legally-present."' 52 The United States used
the word "lawful" to describe immigrants that they claimed would be
"substantial[ly] burden[ed]" by Section 2(B),153 which is a bit vague
but still more accurate than the District Court's word choice. Although
148 Id. at 995.
149 id
iso Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
' Id. at 70.
152 Compare Hines, 312 U.S. at 74 with United States v. Arizona, 703 F.
Supp. 2d. at 995. It is worth noting that that the District Court used "law-
abiding" only one time in its opinion - when it quoted the Supreme Court in
Hines on page 15 of its opinion. Throughout the rest of its opinion, the District
Court continued to use its own phrase "legally present" as a substitute for the
Supreme Court's word choice.
'5 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 994 (quoting Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26).
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seemingly trivial at first blush, there is a tremendous difference
between the word "law-abiding" and "legally-present." An alien can be
legally-present in the United States, and thus be law-abiding in that
limited respect, while at the same time that alien can be engaged in
criminal activity and thus not be law-abiding. Also, though being
unlawfully present in the United States is not itself a crime, an alien
who is not legally present in the United States cannot, by definition, be
law-abiding because the alien would necessarily have had to unlawfully
reenter the United States after deportation, unlawfully enter the United
States, or violate the law in some other fashion in order to become
unlawfully present in the United States.154 Again, the Supreme Court's
concern was over police targeting law-abiding aliens based on their
status as aliens.'5 5  Section 2(B) does not target law-abiding aliens.
Indeed, the second sentence of Section 2(B) would only come into play
after the person has been lawfully arrested (i.e. based on probable
cause) for violation of "a law or ordinance of a county, city, or town of
[Arizona]."l 56 Thus, those persons who would fall under Section 2(B)
would not be "law-abiding." If, after an alien who police have
probable cause to believe committed a state or local law violation is
arrested (for not being law-abiding), and the alien cannot thereafter
produce one of the four forms of identification listed in Section 2(B),
law enforcement, if they reasonably suspect the arrested alien is not
"legally present," would then have the alien's immigration status
verified by the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) in
order to determine the extent of the alien's "un-law-abiding" activity.' 5 7
The fact that the alien may be reasonably suspected of not being
"legally present" cannot serve as a basis for an arrest under Section
2(B) and is only ancillary to the arrest. 5 8
The District Court then turned to the United States' next
argument, that Section 2(B) would lead to such an increased number of
requests to the federal government for immigration status determination
that it would "impermissibly shift the allocation of federal resources
154 See 8 U.S.C. §1326 (making reentry into the United States after
deportation a crime, of which unlawful presence is an element); § 1325
(making unlawful entry into the United States a crime). The District even
acknowledges these crimes in a footnote. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.
Supp. 2d. at 988 n.3.
' Hines, 312 U.S. at 70, 74.
156 Supra note 137.
" See id.
158 See id.
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away from federal priorities."' 59 The Court, in a feeble attempt to
support its agreement with the United States' argument, proceeded to
misapply Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351
(2001), in which the Supreme Court held part of a state law was
partially preempted because it would have given applicants to the FDA
an incentive to "submit a deluge of information that the [FDA] neither
want[ed] nor need[ed], resulting in additional burdens on the FDA's
evaluation of an application."' 0 The District Court misapplied this
case because the Supreme Court's concern was not so much that the
FDA would be burdened with a lot of information, such as could result
from an increased number of applicants, but rather, with a lot of
unnecessary information (in this case, existing applicants sending more
information than usual to insure that their disclosures would be
sufficient in state court).16' The "additional burdens" on the FDA
would have resulted from having to sift through the superfluous
information that it "neither want[ed] nor need[ed]."l62 In this case, one
cannot assume that Arizona law enforcement officers or agencies
would send the federal government more information than necessary to
perform the immigration status verification requests; and, unless they
did, Buckman would not apply. 6 3
15 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 995 (quoting Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 30).
160 Id. (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351).
16l See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351.
162 See id.
163 The only other cases the District Court cited were North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 458-59 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in plurality
opinion in part and dissenting in part) and Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2006). In North Dakota, Brennan did voice
concern that the burden of state regulation on the federal government would
increase if more states followed suit. 495 U.S. at 458-59. However, it will
always be the case that the burden on the federal government will increase any
time a state adopts regulations involving the federal government. It is for
Congress, not the Supreme Court, to decide when that burden would be too
great. See id. at 444. And Congress has thus far chosen not to limit the States'
abilities to send immigration status verification requests to DHS. As Justice
Stevens, who spoke for the plurality in North Dakota v. United States, pointed
out, "It would be both an unwise and an unwarranted extension of the
intergovernmental immunity doctrine for this Court to hold that the burdens
associated with [state regulations]-no matter how trivial they may prove to be-
are sufficient to make them unconstitutional." Id. The District Court also
cited Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at1057, which, though it
appears to support the Court's opinion, is not a very persuasive source; it does
not even have binding authority over the Arizona District Court. The fact that
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The District Court did correctly point out that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has established the Law Enforcement
Support Center (LESC), which is administered by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and "serves as the national
enforcement operations center that promptly provides immigration
status and identity information to local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies regarding aliens suspected of, arrested for, or
convicted of criminal activity."' The Court also correctly pointed out
that LESC expends part of its resources on national security objectives
and handling requests from other government departments.' 6 The
Court then argued that Section 2(B) would cause an increase in
immigration status requests that would force the federal government to
divert resources from its other "responsibilities and priorities,"
implicitly referring to the aforementioned expenditures for assistance to
other federal departments.166
The problem with the Court's analysis, in addition to its flawed
belief that all persons arrested would have their immigration status
checked, is that the Court fails to recognize that Congress has given the
States the privilege to make requests to the federal government
regarding the immigration status of individuals. Though the Court
acknowledged 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), which creates an obligation for the
Department of Homeland Security to provide citizenship or
immigration status information to any federal, state, or local agency
requesting a verification or ascertainment of citizenship for individuals
lawfully within the agency's jurisdiction,' 67 the Court failed to mention
8 U.S.C. § 1873(a), which states the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local
government entity or official may not prohibit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official
from sending to, or receiving from [Department of
Homeland Security] information regarding the
the Arizona District Court had to look to a District Court in California for
authority on this issue is telling.
16 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 995 (quoting Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6-7(citing Palmatier Declaration %1 3-6).)
David Palmatier is the Unit Chief of LESC. See Palmatier Declaration 1 1.
165 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 995 (citing Palmatier
Declaration 1 4).
166 Id. at 995-96.
161 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2010).
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citizenship or immigration status, lawlul or unlawful,
of any individual (emphasis added).' 6
Arguably, under this provision, the District Court, a federal government
entity, does not have the jurisdiction to prohibit, or even restrict, a state
law enforcement officer or agency, i.e. a state officer or government
entity, from sending immigration status requests to the LESC, which is
under DHS. Moreover, as the Court recognized, DHS is required,
under 8 U.S.C. 1373(c), to respond to federal, state, and local requests
for immigration status verification. As for the issue of federal resource
prioritization, even if Section 2(B) led to a significant increase in
immigration status verification requests, Congress has not seen fit to
limit the number of requests that state and local officials and entities
can make. Furthermore, according to LESC, "[t]he number of requests
for information sent to LESC increased from 4,000 in FY 1996 to
807,106 in FY 2008, to 1,133,130 in FY 2010[,]setting a new record
for assistance to other law enforcement agencies."' 69 Thus, LESC is
apparently well-equipped to handle substantial increases in information
requests. And even if LESC had some difficulty responding to a large
influx of requests caused by Section 2(B) and similar state laws across
the country, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) only mandates that DHS respond to
immigration verification requests; it does not set forth a deadline by
which DHS must respond to these requests.170 Thus, the federal
government could still prioritize its responses according to its available
resources at the time.' 7' Therefore, the District Court's analysis is
168 Id. § 1373(a). This language is repeated in (b)(1) of the same section.
The statute refers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), but INS
no longer exists. INS's functions are now largely operated by three agencies
under the Department of Homeland Security. ICE is one of those agencies and
would be implicated here.
169 Supra note 86. It is worth noting that Palmatier, in 15 of his
Declaration, concluded that "Arizona's new law will result in an increase in the
number of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents being queried through
the LESC, reducing our ability to provide timely responses to law enforcement
on serious criminal aliens." This statement, however, stands in stark contrast to
what LESC proudly terms its "Significant Accomplishments" on its website.
Compare supra note 86 with Palmatier Declaration 15-18.
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2010).
1' To support its contention that the provision would result in an increase
in immigration status requests, the Court tried to draw a distinction between
mandatory and discretionary immigration status verification by law
enforcement officials. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 998 n.12
(citing Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26; Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 20.) This author
does not contest the fact that the number of requests will likely increase under a
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highly questionable, and the second sentence of Section 2(B) will likely
not be preempted by federal law.
The proposed South Carolina Code Annotated § 23-3-1300(A) is
South Carolina's version of Arizona's Section 2(B), with a hint of
A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5).17 2 Although parts of the § 23-3-1300(A) are
identical to Section 2(B), the South Carolina version does have some
subtle differences. One such difference is that the first part of the
second sentence of § 23-3-1300(A) is drafted more soundly than
Arizona's Section 2(B) in that it begins by saying, "If the person is
arrested for an alleged violation of state or local law . . . ." (emphasis
added).1 73 The importance of "the person" in this phrase is that it refers
back to the individual discussed in the first sentence of the Section, i.e.
a person with whom law enforcement came into "lawful contact" and
who law enforcement reasonably suspects is "unlawfully present in the
United States."l 74 The second sentence then mentions that law
enforcement may "arrest the person without a warrant" and "shall
determine the person 's immigration status before the person is released
from custody" (emphasis added).1 7 5 This re-usage of the phrase "the
person" connects the second sentence to the first sentence, and more
clearly than did Arizona's Section 2(B). For the reasons stated by
this author in the discussion of the second sentence of Section 2(B),
this part of the provision would likely not be preempted by federal law.
Another difference between § 23-3-1300(A) and Section 2(B) is
that § 23-3-1300(A) allows warrantless arrests based on probable cause
that the suspect has committed a removable offense. However, for the
reasons discussed in Part I(A)(5), this part of the provision would be
preempted by federal law.17 7 Also, though there is another difference
between the South Carolina and Arizona provisions, located in the first
mandatory-where-applicable scheme. However, for the reasons discussed, this
would likely not pose a problem for the federal government.
172 The "hint" of A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5) referred to is the ability of state
law enforcement to make a warrantless arrest of a person who officers have
probable cause to believe has committed an offense that makes them removable
from the United States. See supra Part I(A)(5); see also S.C. Bill, Section 23-
3-1300(A). Otherwise, the bill is almost identical to Arizona's Section 2(B).
See S.C. Bill, Section 23-3-1300(A).
"' See S.C. Bill, Section 23-3-1300(A).
174 id.
176 Compare S.C. Bill, Section 23-3-1300(A) with S.B. 1070, Section
2(B).
17 See supra Part I(A)(5).
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sentence of § 23-3-1300(A), this author will discuss that difference in
the next section separately because the District Court discussed the first
sentence of Arizona's Section 2(B) separately.
b. Immigration Status Determination During Lawful Stops, Detentions,
or Arrests
After its discussion of the second sentence of Section 2(B), the
District Court turned its attention to the first sentence of that provision.
The United States made almost the same arguments against the first
sentence of Section 2(B) as it did in its argument against the second
sentence. Essentially, the United States argued that this provision
would impose a substantial burden on lawfully-present aliens, in
violation of Hines, and would "impermissibly burden[] and redirect[]
federal resources away from federally-established priorities."' 78
Because the Court noted that the United States' arguments concerning
the burden on federal resources was identical to those already
discussed,179 this author will likewise not discuss those arguments any
further.
The United States also contended that Section 2(B) "necessarily
places lawfully present aliens (and even U.S. citizens) in continual
jeopardy of having to demonstrate their lawful status to non-federal
officials."' 80 The United States then claimed that a number of lawfully-
present aliens "who will not have readily available documentation to
demonstrate that fact," such as foreign visitors under the Visa Waiver
Program, asylum applicants who have not yet received an adjudication,
those with temporary protected status, those who have applied for U
and T non-immigrant visas, or those who have petitioned for relief
under the Violence Against Women Act.' 8'
The United States further argued that the burden on lawfully-
present aliens would be heightened because they could be stopped for
"minor, non-criminal violations of state law, including jay walking,
failing to have a dog on a leash, or riding a bicycle on the sidewalk;"
and because they are aliens, police would be more likely to reasonably
suspect them of being in the United States unlawfully; and that
178 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 996 (citing Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26).
17 Id.
'80 Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26).
181 Id. at 996-97 (quoting Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
26-27).
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reasonable suspicion would give law enforcement the authority to,
"where practicable, check the immigration status" of those lawfully-
present aliens. 182 Finally, the United States curiously added that the
burden on lawfully-present aliens would be enhanced because "other
provisions in S.B. 1070 put pressure on law enforcement agencies and
officials to enforce the immigration laws vigorously." 8 3
The District Court agreed completely with the federal
government. The Court cited the Supreme Court's concerns in Hines
over police harassment of "lawfully-present"'8 aliens through "the
possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance" 8 5  and
over "the important federal responsibility to maintain international
relationships, for the protection of American citizens abroad as well as
to ensure uniform national foreign policy."' 8 6
This author will not discuss the portion of the first sentence that
pertains to "arrests," because it was discussed earlier.'8 7  However,
many of the same arguments employed in Part I(C)(1)(a), or variations
thereon, are applicable here. In its discussion of the first sentence of
Section 2(B), the District Court extended its flawed analysis, first by
continuing to misapply Hines, by continuing to refer to "lawfully-
present" aliens rather than the "law-abiding" aliens the Supreme Court
referred to,' 88 which made it far more convenient for the Court to arrive
at some of its conclusions. In order for a stop or detention to be
"lawful," an officer must have reasonable suspicion of a law
violation.189 Thus, Section 2(B) would not target law-abiding aliens or
require "[their] papers [to] be routinely demanded and checked" 90
because it would require law enforcement to have reasonable suspicion
of a violation of some "other law or ordinance of a county, city, or
182 Id. at 997 (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief at 28-29.)
183 Id (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief at 29.) Specifically,
the United States was referring to Sections 2(A) and 2(H), "which, respectively,
prohibit agencies from restricting the enforcement of immigration laws and
create a private right of action for legal residents to sue agencies if they believe
the laws are not being enforced aggressively enough." Id. at n.10.
'8 This is the District Court's wording, not the Supreme Court's. The
Supreme Court's language, as discussed, was "law-abiding."
185 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 997 (quoting Hines, 312
U.S. at 74).
186 Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-66).
.87 See supra Part I(C)(1)(a).
188 See supra note 152.
189 United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 2010).
190 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 997 (quoting Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26).
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town of [Arizona]" and then additional reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is an alien or unlawfully present in the United States before law
enforcement could even attempt to determine the suspect's immigration
status. Even then, law enforcement would be required to make a
"reasonable attempt" to make this determination "when practicable."l 91
It is also hardly fathomable how Section 2(B) would place law-
abiding aliens and U.S. citizens in "continual jeopardy"l92 of having to
present identification to law enforcement. Unless the alien was
continually engaged in behavior that gave rise to reasonable suspicion
of law violations, that alien would not be in "continual jeopardy" of
having to produce their identification to state law enforcement.
Granted, some categories of aliens, which the United States mentioned,
such as foreign visitors participating in the Visa Waiver Program,
applicants for asylum whose cases have not yet been adjudicated,
individuals with temporary protected status, U and T non-immigrant
visa applicants, and petitioners for relief under the Violence Against
Women Act, may not have ready access to documentation to
demonstrate that they are lawfully present within the United States. 93
However, all of these groups of aliens would have their identification
stored in a federal computer database (not necessarily the DHS
database), and their identification could thus be ascertained using
information that the aliens could readily provide to state law
enforcement, such as their names, addresses, where they are from, and
through which program they gained access to the United States. 94 For
similar reasons, United States citizens who are stopped or detained and
do not have ready access to identification should be able to provide law
enforcement with enough information whereby law enforcement would
be able to ascertain their identities as citizens. The likelihood of a
citizen being unable to gain access to, or provide information that
would gain access to, a form of identification would be so minimal that
it does not rise to the level of concern. The Court may be correct that
some legal residents will be "swept up by this requirement,""' but so
191 See supra note 137.
192 This hyperbole was used by the United States in an apparently-
successful attempt to shock the conscious of the Court.
193 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 996-97 (citing Plaintiff s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26-27).
194 This author is advocating these alternative forms of verification only
for those aliens in the categories cited by the Court. Other aliens would be
without excuse for not carrying their registration certificates or receipts because
they are required to do so under 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e).
195 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 995.
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are innocent drivers who are required to produce their driver's licenses
at routine traffic stops. 196
According to U.S. v. Christian, law enforcement can lawfully ask
for, or even demand, a suspect's identification where the officer has
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.' 97 Also, "[a] brief [Terry]
stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,
may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time" (emphasis added).19 8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Christian further noted that in one of its previous cases, "[b]ecause an
officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, [it had] held that
his request for identification, questions about the suspect's prior
contacts with law enforcement, and a check for outstanding warrants or
previous arrests, were all within the scope of the officer's authority." 99
Because the first sentence of Section 2(B) would only allow law
enforcement, during lawful stops or detentions, to determine
immigration status as part of the identification process following
reasonable suspicion of some other violation of state or local law200 and
of the person's unlawful presence in the United States, it is
constitutional. 201 Furthermore, the District Court's fear that lawfully-
196 The Court mentions in a footnote that it is aware of the "potentially
serious Fourth Amendment problems with the inevitable increase in length of
detention while immigration status is determined," an argument that the United
States has raised in a separate case: Friendly House, et al. v. Whiting, et al., No.
CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB. Id. at n.6. However, because the Court fails to
discuss it at length, neither will this author. This author will mention, however,
that though the length of detentions would inevitably increase, with the advent
of high-speed computer systems, the 4th Amendment concerns about
excessively lengthy detentions seem to be without merit.
197 356 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004).
198 Id. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
1 Id. (citing United States v. Osbom, 203 F.3d 1176, 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.
2000)).
200 It is important to remember that "arrest" is not mentioned here but is
included in the first sentence of Section 2(B). It is not mentioned because it
was discussed separately in supra Part I(C)(1)(a). In the case of an arrest, the
difference would be that law enforcement would need probable cause of
unlawful activity, not just reasonable suspicion, in addition to reasonable
suspicion of an alien's unlawful presence in the United States.
201 It is worth noting that the Court, in its effort to show why the number
of immigration verification requests would increase (because of mandatory
determinations where practicable), actually admitted that many law
enforcement officials are already allowed to verify immigration status based on
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1006 n.12.
148 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
present (and presumably law-abiding) aliens who could not readily
present documentation would be "potentially subject[ed] ... to arrest or
detention" is unfounded because, as the Court in Christian recognized,
"failure to identify oneself cannot, on its own, justify an arrest." 202 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Osborn, similarly noted that
"interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by
the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure." 203
The United States' argument that the impact on lawfully-present
aliens from Section 2(B)'s mandatory immigration status checks would
be greatly enhanced because the provision would apply to minor, non-
criminal state-law violations 204 is without merit because only those
reasonably suspected of breaking these laws and who are also
suspected of being unlawfully present in the United States would be
affected. Again, those who are law-abiding, or at least those who
reasonably appear to be so, would not be affected.
As for the United States' curious argument that the provision's
impact on lawfully-present aliens will also be greatly enhanced due to
the pressure on law enforcement to enforce the immigration laws
vigorously, 205 with which the Court agreed, the simple response is that
law enforcement is always expected to enforce all laws vigorously.
While it is true that Sections 2(A) and 2(H), respectively, prohibit
agencies from restricting the enforcement of immigration laws and
create a private right of action against agencies for failure to enforce
the immigration laws aggressively enough,206 it is ludicrous for the
Court to imply that police would have no discretion in enforcing
The Court's exact wording was "Many law enforcement officials already have
the discretion to verify immigration status if they have reasonable suspicion, in
the absence of S.B. 1070." Id. Thus, the Court admitted that S.B. 1070 would
not create a new power for law enforcement to verify immigration status based
on reasonable suspicion; it would just make it mandatory where practicable
instead of completely discretionary. It is also worth noting that the "where
practicable" language of Section 2(B) would suggest that verification of the
immigration status of suspects would still be at least somewhat discretionary
during lawful stops, detentions, or arrests.
202 Christian, 356 F.3d at 1106.
203 203 F.3d at 1176, 1180 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216
(1984)).
204 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 997 (citing Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 28).
205 Id. (citing Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 29).
206 See H.B. 2162, Section 3(A), (H).
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Arizona's immigration laws.207 Also, police always face the possibility
of being sued for misconduct for failing to enforce the law in a proper
manner. Besides, if a legal resident brought an action under 2(H), he or
she would have the burden of proving the alleged violation, which
would seem rather difficult to do. Moreover, the police officer or
agency would be awarded court costs and reasonable attorney's fees if
they "prevail[] by an adjudication on the merits."208 Furthermore, even
if a law enforcement officer lost the case, he or she would be
indemnified by his or her agency as long as he or she acted in good
faith in enforcing the immigration laws. 209 Thus, law enforcement, at
the very least, would likely not be under any greater pressure than they
already are to enforce the laws vigorously. Even still, it was
inappropriate for the Court to base part of its ruling on a hypothetical
assumption that law enforcement would be under so much pressure to
enforce S.B. 1070 that it would target all aliens and anyone appearing
to be an alien and would harass them with immigration status checks, if
for no other reason, to avoid a lawsuit.
The Court correctly pointed out that in Hines, the Supreme Court
emphasized "federal responsibility to maintain international
relationships, for the protection of American citizens abroad as well as
to ensure uniform national foreign policy." 2'0 The District Court then
reasoned that it would damage the United States' foreign policy and
relationships with other nations if we subjected foreign visitors to the
alleged burdens imposed by the first sentence of Section 2(B).21 1
However, it would hardly damage our foreign relations, assuming any
nations even batted an eye, if news spread throughout the global
community that one of our State's law enforcement officials asked a
visiting alien for identification, let alone such a request being made
under the circumstances under which Section 2(B) would be
implicated.2 12 If anything, it would seem that the visiting alien's home
nation would be somewhat ashamed and apologetic that one of its
citizens was engaged in behavior that reasonably gave rise to a
suspicion, if not probable cause, of lawless activity.
207 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999) (noting
that it "flies in the face of common sense" to interpret a statutory provision
containing mandatory language in regards to enforcement of a law as meaning
that police would have no discretion).
208 See H.B. 2162, Section 3(J).
209 See id. Section 3(K).
210 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 997 (citing Hines, 312
U.S. at 62-66).
211 id.
212 See supra note 137.
150 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
Finally, as mentioned supra Part I(C)(1)(a), Congress granted
state and local government entities and officials (in addition to the
federal government entities and officials) the unrestricted privilege of
"sending to, or receiving from the [Department of Homeland Security]
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual" (emphasis added).2 3 Also, the federal
government "shall respond" to inquiries from a state or local
government agency "seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the
agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested
verification or status information" (emphasis added).214 As mentioned,
a stop or detention that is based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful
activity, which is required for Section 2(B) to be implicated, is a lawful
stop or detention, i.e. one that is conducted for a "purpose authorized
by law." 215 Furthermore, no authorization agreement with the Attorney
General is necessary to "communicate with the Attorney General
regarding the immigration status of any individual. ... 216 Clearly, the
LESC has the same interpretation of the federal law because it states on
its webpage that it "provides timely customs information and
immigration status and identity information and real-time assistance to
local, state and federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected,
arrested or convicted of criminal activity" (emphasis added).217 This
shows that LESC also interprets the federal law as allowing state and
local law enforcement agencies to send immigration status requests to
DHS (specifically, LESC) for aliens who are only suspected of criminal
activity, as indicated by the disjunctive "or." 218
The United States will likely not succeed on its challenge to the
first sentence of Section 2(B) because: the first sentence of Section
2(B), like the second sentence, would not impose an unacceptable
burden on law-abiding aliens; the first sentence, like the second
sentence of Section 2(B), would not impermissibly burden federal
resources and priorities, for the same reasons given supra Part
I(C)(1)(a); and because Congress has expressly authorized state and
local government entities and officials to check the immigration status
of those individuals lawfully within their jurisdiction for a lawful
213 See supra note 168a; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(1).
214 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
215 See supra note 137; see also Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1274.
216 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A).
217 Supra note 86.
218 d.
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purpose. Thus, Section 2(B) in its entirety will likely not be preempted
by federal law.
In contrast, the first sentence of the proposed South Carolina
Code Annotated § 23-3-1300, South Carolina's version of Section
2(B), would likely be preempted by federal law. It adopted the
language of the old S.B. 1070, Section 2(B) language by using the
phrase "lawful contact." 2 1 9  The problem with this language is that
"lawful contact" is broad and vague, going beyond "stops, detentions,
and arrests," and would cover any sort of contact with persons, as long
as it is not illegal.220 The only reasonable suspicion required would be
that the suspect is an alien and unlawfully present in the United
States. 221 The police would likely use the "lawful contact," which
would require no reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity if it was not
a stop or detention, and no probable cause if it was not an arrest, to
obtain the specific and articulable facts 222 necessary to give rise to the
reasonable suspicion that the person was an alien unlawfully present in
the United States. Therefore, in situations where the police would lack
reasonable suspicion of some other unlawful activity, the police would
be able to do through the back door what they would not be able to do
through the front door.
It is true that police officers do not need reasonable suspicion to
initiate contact with a suspect as long as the suspect consents. If the
suspect does not give consent or withdraws it, police would need to
have at least reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable
facts in light of the totality of the circumstances, of unlawful activity to
detain the suspect further.224 If the suspect ignores or refuses to answer
questions, this does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.225 However,
given the close connection between race or ethnicity and immigration,
and because § 23-3-1300 would not require reasonable suspicion based
on specific and articulable facts of unlawful activity for police to
contact suspects, it would be too easy for law enforcement to racially
profile or target individuals based on their status as aliens, which Hines
forbids.226 Thus, in the absence of at least reasonable suspicion of
some other unlawful activity, even if the suspect consented to the
219 See supra note 133.
220 See S.C. Bill, supra note 22a, at Section 1: § 23-3-1300(A).
221 See id.
222 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
223 United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d. 116, 126 (4th Cir. 1991).
224 id.
225 id
226 Hines, 312 U.S. at 70, 74.
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police's questioning, the initiation of the encounter would be tainted
because it would have been motivated by racial profiling or targeting of
the suspect based on their status as an alien. Moreover, even if police
learned facts about a person being an illegal alien from other people,
this would almost certainly have resulted from the police approaching
these people and asking them questions to that effect; and the police
would almost certainly have no basis for asking other people about a
person's immigration status unless they had first targeted the person
based on his or her race or status as an alien.227
It is arguable that a contact motivated by racial profiling or some
other form of illegal discrimination could not be a "lawful" contact and
would therefore be excluded from the statutory definition. Indeed, any
implementation of this provision based solely on race, color, or national
origin is forbidden under the same subsection.228 However, even if this
"lawful contact" was not solely based on race, color, or national origin,
and even if police did not target aliens based on their status as such,
these facts would not save the provision from being vague - it fails to
provide police with guidance as to when and under what circumstances
contact can be made. Because the phrase "lawful contact" is left
undefined, and would thus fail to curb police discretion, the provision
would be impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.229
D. THE DISTRICT COURT'S TROUBLESOME CONCLUSIONS
BASED ON SOLID ANALYSIS
Because the Court reached some incorrect conclusions earlier in
its opinion, it consequently reached incorrect conclusions as to the
likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public
interest in regard to those earlier conclusions, notwithstanding the
sound analysis that it employed in doing so.
227 A tip from an informant would give rise to reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable
suspicion where the suspect fit the description of an informant's tip). However,
it would be highly unlikely that police would receive a tip from a credible
informant about a person's immigration status.
228 See supra note 22a, at Section 1(A).
229 See Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (holding that an anti-gang loitering ordinance
did not sufficiently curb police discretion and was thus impermissibly vague in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).
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1. LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE HARM
The District Court correctly stated that courts of equity can only
issue equitable relief when no other remedy at law exists and
irreparable harm would likely result if relief was denied.23 o The
District Court then cited and quoted a number of cases supporting the
notion that where a State's enforcement of a statute is
unconstitutionally preempted by federal law and would undermine the
federal government's implementation of its policies and objectives, it
would likely result in irreparable harm, even if the state statute and
federal law had largely the same goals.231
This author agrees with this notion and the Court's analysis, but
disagrees with the Court's conclusion that all of the provisions that it
enjoined would result in irreparable harm to the United States.
Specifically, Arizona's Section 2(B) would not result in irreparable
harm to the federal government because it would likely not be
preempted by federal law and would not inhibit or undermine the
federal government's ability to enforce its immigration laws. The
United States, which had the burden of proving the likelihood of
irreparable harm,232 simply failed to do so for the reasons stated supra
Part I(C)(1)(a), (b). If the United States challenges South Carolina, it
will likely be able to show irreparable harm resulting from the first
sentence of §23-3-1300(A) for the reasons stated supra Part I(C)(1)(b);
from the part of § 23-3-1300(A) that allows warrantless arrests based
on probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a removable
offense, for the reasons stated supra Part I(A)(5); and from § 16-9-470
for the reasons stated supra Part I(B)(1).
2. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The District Court correctly stated that "allowing a state to
enforce a state law in violation of the Supremacy Clause is neither
230 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. at 1006 (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374-75).
231 Id. at 1006-07 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.
374, 381 (1992); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Edmondson,
594 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 878 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Crosby v. Nat'1
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379-80 & n.14 (2000)).
232 Id. at 1006 (citing Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374-75).
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equitable nor in the public interest." 233 The Court also properly found
that if the enforcement of a state statute "would likely burden legal
resident aliens and interfere with federal policy," then it should be
preliminarily enjoined, so that the federal government could "continue
to pursue federal priorities, which is inherently in the public interest,
until a final judgment is reached in this case." 234
This author agrees with these principles but not with the Court's
conclusion that all of the provisions that it enjoined warranted an
injunction for the sake of equity and the public interest. Similar to the
points made in the discussion on irreparable harm, Arizona's Section
2(B) would likely not interfere with federal policy or burden law-
abiding resident aliens, and therefore would not require an equitable
remedy for the federal government to continue to pursue its
immigration policies in the public interest. The United States, which
had the burden of showing that it was entitled to injunctive relief,235
simply failed to do so for the reasons stated supra Part I(C)(1)(a), (b).
If the United States challenges South Carolina, it will likely be able to
show that the public interest would be served by granting it injunctive
relief from the first sentence of §23-3-1300(A) for the reasons stated
supra Part I(C)(1)(b); from the part of § 23-3-1300(A) that allows
warrantless arrests based on probable cause to believe a suspect has
committed a removable offense, for the reasons stated supra Part
I(A)(5); and from § 16-9-470 for the reasons stated supra Part I(B)(1).
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S PENDING
IMMIGRATION STATUTE: H. 4919
The following amendments should be made to South Carolina's
pending immigration statute, H. 4919, in order to remediate
controversial language and to help the statute succeed against any
constitutional challenges:
233 Id. at 1007 (citing Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d
847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2009)).
234 Id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046,
1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009)).
235 Id at 1007 (citing Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374).
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A. SECTION 1. CHAPTER 3, TITLE 23 OF THE 1976 CODE IS
AMENDED BY ADDING:
"Section 23-3-1300 (A) Notwithstanding another provision Of
236 For any lawful contact, stop, detention,
or arrest 237 made by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement
agency of this State or a law enforcement agency of a county, city,
town, or other political subdivision of this State in the enforcement of
any other law or ordinance of a county, city, or town of this State where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully
present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person, except if
the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. if-the-persen
is arrested for an alleged violation of state Or Wceal law or the officer
an offense which makes the perSOn remoevable fromF the United States,
the law enforceement officer may arrest the person without a warrant,
and the law enforeenet officer or agency shall determine the perSOn'S
inffigiation status before the person is released from custody. The
person's immigration status maust be verified with the federal
government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1373(e). A law enferceement
Official Or agency Of this State or a couty muiiaiti, Or other:
political subdivision of this State may not solely consider race, color, ei
national origin in implementing the requirements of this section except
to the extent ne~mited by the United States Or South Carolina - .- " ~ - - - ----
Constitution. A238 However. a person is presumed to not be an alien
who is unlawfully present in the United States if the person provides to
the law enforcement officer or agency any of the following:
(1) a valid South Carolina driver's license;
(2) a valid South Carolina identification card;
(3) a valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal
identification; or
(4) if the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United States
before issuance, any valid United States federal, state, or local
government issued identification.
236 The black-lined text contains those portions from the original H. 4919
language that this author has either omitted or relocated within the text.
237 The underlined portions of the text are this author's proposed changes
to the original H. 4919 language.
238 The entire portion pertaining to removable offenses is omitted for the
reasons discussed supra Part I(A)(5), at 17-18.
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If the person suspected of being unlawfully present in the United States
presents any of these four forms of identification to the law
enforcement officer during a lawful stop, detention, or arrest, in the
enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city, or town of
this State, that suspected person will be presumed to not be an alien
who is unlawfully present in the United States and the suspected
person's immigration status shall not be verified, unless the law
enforcement officer or agency has clear and convincing evidence to
rebut the presumption of the suspected person's legal presence in the
United States, in which case the suspected person's immigration status
must be verified with the federal government pursuant to 8 United
States Code Section 1373(c). If any of these four forms of
identification are not presented by the suspected person to the law
enforcement officer during a lawful stop, detention, or arrest, in the
enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city, or town of
this State, a reasonable attempt must be made, when practicable, to
determine the immigration status of the person, except if the
determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Following a
lawful arrest in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a
county, city, or town of this State, if the suspected person was unable
produce one of the aforementioned four forms of identification, and law
enforcement was unable to determine the immigration status of the
suspected person, that person's immigration status must be verified
with the federal government pursuant to 8 United States Code Section
1373(c) before the person is released from custody. 239  A law
enforcement official or agency of this State or a county, municipality,
or other political subdivision of this State may not solely consider race,
color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this
section except to the extent permitted by the United States or South
Carolina Constitution.
(B) If an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States is
convicted of a violation of State or local law, on discharge from
imprisonment or on the assessment of any monetary obligation that is
imposed, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement or
239 The reasons for these changes are discussed supra Part I(A)(5), at 17-
18; (C)(1)(a), (b), at 35-36, 45-47. The new language is a combination of the
original language, Arizona's language, and this author's language, and is meant
to provide more specificity and clarity in order to combat racial profiling and
curb state law enforcement's discretion.
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the United States Customs and Border Protection shall be immediately
notified pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1373(c). 240
(C) Notwithstanding another provision of law, a law enforcement
agency may securely transport an alien who the ageney has received
verification according to verification from the federal government
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), is unlawfully present in the United
States and who is in the agency's custody to a federal facility in this
State or to another point of transfer into federal custody that is outside
the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency. A law enforcement
agency shall obtain judicial autherization A law enforcement agency
shall obtain authorization from the Attorney General of the United
States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 4 1357(g)(1) before securely transporting an
alien who is unlawfully present in the United States to a point of
transfer that is outside of this State.241
(D) In the implementation of this section, an alien's immigration
status shall be determined by:
(1) a law enforcement officer who is authorized by the federal
government to verify or ascertain an alien's immigration status; or
(2) the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the
United States Customs and Border Protection pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
Section 1373(c). 242
(E) Except as provided by federal law, officials or agencies of this
State and counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions of
this State may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from
sending, receiving, or maintaining information relating to the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchanging
that information with another federal, state, or local governmental
entity for the following official purposes:
(1) determining eligibility for any public benefit, service, or license
provided by any federal, state, local or other political subdivision of
this State;
240 This language is taken from A.R.S. § 11-1051(C). No similar language
is found in the H. 4919. It is included here because it promotes cooperation
with the federal authorities while preserving the right of States to punish
offenders of state or local law.
241 See supra note 88. The language is added to this provision to prevent
future challenges to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-1300(B).
242 The reason for these changes is discussed supra Part I(A)(5), at 17-18.
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(2) verifying any claim of residence or domicile if determination of
residence or domicile is required under the laws of this State or a
judicial order issued pursuant to a civil or criminal proceeding in this
State;
(3) if the person is an alien, determining whether the person is in
compliance with the federal registration laws prescribed by Title II,
Chapter 7 of the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act; or
(4) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1373 and 8 U.S.C. Section 1644.
(F) This section does not implement, authorize, or establish and may
not be construed to implement, authorize, or establish the REAL ID act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, division B; 119 Stat. 302), including the use of a
radio frequency identification chip.
(G) A person who is a legal resident of this State may bring an action
in circuit court to challenge any official or agency of this State or a
county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this State that
adopts or implements a policy or practice that limits or restricts the
enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent
permitted by federal law. If there is a judicial finding that an entity has
violated this section, the court shall order that the entity pay a civil
penalty of not less than one thousand dollars and not more than five
thousand dollars for each day that the policy has remained in effect
after the filing of an action pursuant to this subsection.
(H) The court may award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to
a person or official or agency of this State or a county, municipality, or
other political subdivision of this State that prevails by an adjudication
on the merits in a proceeding brought pursuant to this section.
(I) Except in relation to matters in which the officer is adjudged to
have acted in bad faith, a law enforcement officer is indemnified by the
law enforcement officer's agency against reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the officer in
connection with any action, suit, or proceeding brought pursuant to this
section in which the officer may be a defendant by reason of the officer
being or having been a member of the law enforcement agency.
(J) This section must be implemented in a manner consistent with
federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all
persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States
citizens."
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B. SECTION 2. ARTICLE 5, CHAPTER 9, TITLE 16 OF THE 1976
CODE IS AMENDED BY ADDING:
"Section 16-9-470 (A) In addition to a violation of federal law, a
person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien
registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section
1304(e) er 1306(a) 1306(a) or 1304(e), respectively.
(B) In the enforcement of this section, an alien's immigration status
may-shall be determined by:
(1) a law enforcement officer who is authorized by the federal
government to verify or ascertain an alien's immigration status; or
(2) the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement or the
United States Customs and Border Protection pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
Section 1373(c).
(C) A person who is sentenced pursuant to this section is not eligible
for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon, commutation of
sentence, or release from confinement on any basis until the sentene
imposed by the court has been serv'ed or the pesnis eligible for
release pursuant to another provision of law-until the person is eligible
for release pursuant to another provision of law.243
(D) in addition to another penaly prsfibed by law, the court shall
order the person to pay jail costs and an additional assessment in the
following amounts:
(1) not less than five hundred dollars for a first offense violation; andA
(2) not less than one thousand dollars for a second or subsequent
offense pursuant to this sectiont.
(D) Notwithstanding another provision of law, a law enforcement
agency may securely transport an alien who, according to verification
from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), is
unlawfully present in the United States and who is in the agency's
custody to a federal facility in this State or to another point of transfer
into federal custody that is outside the jurisdiction of the law
enforcement agency. A law enforcement agency shall obtain
authorization from the Attorney General of the United States pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. 6 1357(g)(1) before securely transporting an alien who is
243 This language is added to clarify S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-470, which
otherwise would make little, if any, sense. The prior language is discussed
supra note 121.
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unlawfully present in the United States to a point of transfer that is
outside of this State. 2 "
(E) Any alien who willfully violates 8 U.S.C. Section 1306(a) shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined
not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or
both. Any alien who willfully violates 8 U.S.C. Section 1304(e) shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction for each offense
be fined not to exceed $100 or be imprisoned not more than thirty days,
or both.245
(F) In addition to these penalties or another penalty prescribed by
law, the court shall order the person to pay jail costs. 246
(G) This section does not apply to a person who maintains
authorization from the federal government to remain in the United
States.
(E) This seetion does not apply to a person who mfain~tains
authorizaticn from the federal government to remain in the United
States.
(H) Any record that relates to the immigration status of a person is
admissible in any court without further foundation or testimony from a
custodian of records if the record is certified as authentic by the
government agency that is responsible for maintaining the record.
(F) ATy reoford that roates o the i igratie status of a person is
admaissible in any cetul withut fther foundation or testimony frmn -a
eustodian hy riesords if the record is ertified as authentic by the
geveffeat agency that is respcnsible fcr maintaining the record.
() A violation of this section is a isdemeaneo, except that a
pvilations of this setion is:
(1) a Class E felony if the person violates this setion while in
pstes, 8oUf any of the following:
244 The reason for this provision is discussed supra notes 88 and 238. The
reason why this provision is inserted a second time is because it not only fits
well in its original location in Section 1(C), but also relates closely to the other
provisions of Section 2.
245 Subsection (E) contains the exact penalty imposed by the federal
statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e) and 1306(a). The reason for this new language is
discussed supra Part I(B)(l), at 24-25.
246 Subsection (F) was not in the South Carolina bill, but is taken from
A.R.S. § 13-1509(E).
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ibstance as defined in Section 44 53 110;a cdirclcasu
(b) preurs-9-4 he)Ias that afe used in the manufacamngotr
methamphetamine inviolation of Seetion or 53 375;
(e) a fireand as proavided in Seetion 16 23 530 or other deadly
weapen-ef
(d) property that is used for the purpose of comiitting an act ot
teaorism or a VioA-tion of Au4icele 7, Chapter 23, Title 16.
(2) a Class D felonty if the person either:
(a) is unavicted of a second or subsequent violation of this section;
Of
(b) within sixty months before the violation, has been removed from
the United States pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1229(a) er has acepted
a voluntary remoeval fromf the United States pursuant to S U.S.C.
1229(c)."
C. SECTION 3. ARTICLES5, CHAPTER 9, TITLE 16 OF THE 19 76
CODE IS A MENDED B YADDING:
"Section 16-9-480 (A) It is unlawful for an occupant of a motor
vehicle that is stopped on a street, roadway, or highway to attempt to
hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location-if
the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the norMal movement of traffic. 
247
(B3) It is unlawful for a person to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped
on a street, roadway, or highway in order to be hired by an occupant of
the motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location-if
the motor vehicle blecks or impedes the nounal moevement of traffic.
it is unlawfu~l tor a person vwho
United States and who is an unauthorize
is unlawfully present in the
d alien to krnowingly apply fot
247 "[I1f the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of
traffic" is omitted. This language would be too difficult to enforce. If no other
drivers were coming, then a person would still be able to stop in a road to pick
up a worker. Also, it would require a police officer to be right there to
determine that a car was coming at the time the violator stopped in the road to
pick up the worker; a car could be coming in either direction right after the
person picked up the worker and began driving away, in which case the driver
would no longer be "blocking or impeding the normal movement of traffic."
Besides, most pickups would take place on the side of the road anyway, which
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work, solicit work in a public. place, Or perform work as an employce or
independent contractor in this State.
(D) A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanorr and, upon cnvition, rmust be fin d not fre than five
hundred dollars or imprisoned fo not more than thity days.
(E) For the purposes fthis section, the ter
() 'Selieit' means verbal oe neverbal eeunioation by a gesr e
r a nod tha would indicate to a reasonable person that a person is
willing to be employed.
(2) 'Unauthized alien' means an alien who does not have the legal
right Or authorization putisant to federal law to work in the United
States as desrtibed in r U.S.. 132(a)(h)(3)."
D. SECTION 4
"The repeal or amendment by this act of any law, whether
temporary or permanent or civil or criminal, does not affect pending
actions, rights, duties, or liabilities founded thereon, or alter, discharge,
release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under
the repealed or amended law, unless the repealed or amended provision
shall so expressly provide. After the effective date of this act, all laws
repealed or amended by this act must be taken and treated as remaining
in ftill force and effect for the purpose of sustaining any pending or
vested right, civil action, special proceeding, criminal prosecution, or
appeal existing as of the effective date of this act, and for the
enforcemeat of rights, duties, penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities as
they stood under the repealed or amended laws."
E. SECTIONS5
"If any section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence,
clause, phrase, or word of this act is for any reason held to be
unconstitutional or invalid, such holding shall not affect the
constitutionality or validity of the remaining portions of this act, the
General Assembly hereby declaring that it would have passed this act,
and each and every section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph,
sentence, clause, phrase, and word thereof, irrespective of the fact that
any one or more other sections, subsections, paragraphs,
subparagraphs, sentences, clauses, phrases, or words hereof may be
declared to be unconstitutional, invalid, or otherwise ineffective."
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F. SECTION 6
"This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor."
----XX----
III. CONCLUSION
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
correctly denied the United States' motion for preliminary injunction as
to Senate Bill 1070 (as amended by House Bill 2162), Sections 1, 2(A)
and (C)-(L), 4, the parts of 5 enacting A.R.S. §§ 13-2929, -2928(A) and
(B), and 7-13. The District Court also correctly granted the United
States' motion for preliminary injunction as to the part of Section 5
enacting A.R.S. 13-2928(C), and Section 6 enacting A.R.S. § 13-
3883(A)(5). Also, the Court, notwithstanding its weak analysis,
properly enjoined Section 3 enacting A.R.S. § 13-1509. However, the
Court erred in preliminarily enjoining Section 2(B) enacting A.R.S. §
11-1051(B). The Court also may have erred in failing to enjoin Section
2(D) enacting A.R.S. § 11-1051(D). These rulings by the District
Court have no binding authority on South Carolina, but they may serve
as an indicator of the constitutional challenges that South Carolina's
pending immigration reform bill, House Bill 4919, may face,
specifically as to most of Section 1(A) enacting S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-
3-1300(A), Section 1(B) enacting S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-1300(B), and
Section 2 enacting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-470. Therefore, it is the
hope of this author that the South Carolina Legislature will adopt at
least some, if not all, all of the proposed amendments stated herein or
otherwise make the necessary changes to its bill.

